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In February 2005, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan referred to the decline in 
long-term rates in the wake of the Fed increasing the target for the federal 
funds rate by 150 basis points as a “conundrum.” Greenspan’s remarks 
generated considerable interest and research. I document that the 
relationship between Treasury yields and the federal funds rate changed 
dramatically in the late 1980s, well in advance of Greenspan’s 
observation. I hypothesize that the marked change in the relationship is a 
consequence of the Federal Open Market Committee switching from using 
the funds rate as an operating instrument to using the funds rate to 
implement monetary policy, i.e., change in the relationship is an instance 
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It is widely recognized that the relationship between the federal funds rate and long-term 
rates, such as the 10-year Treasury yield, changed around 2004. In his February 17, 2005, 
testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the U.S. 
Senate, Alan Greenspan observed that long-term rates had trended lower despite the 150-
basis-point rise in the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target for the federal 
funds rate. Greenspan termed this apparent aberrant behavior of Treasury yields relative 
to the funds rate a “conundrum.” 
Researchers have attempted to attribute the conundrum to a variety of factors with 
little success. Rather than focusing on the period that prompted Greenspan’s observation, 
as previous research has done, I investigate the timing of the change in the relationship 
between the federal funds rate and the 10-year Treasury rate using data since the early 
1980s. I find that there was a statistically significant change in the relationship between 
Treasury yields and the fund rate that occurred in the late 1980s and that there was no 
statistically significant change in the relationship before or after that date. The timing of 
the change coincides closely with the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) paying 
increased attention to the federal funds rate in the implementation of monetary policy that 
I have documented elsewhere (Thornton, 2006). I hypothesize that the marked change in 
the relationship occurred because the FOMC switched from using the funds rate as an 
operating instrument (i.e., a guide for conducting daily open market operations) to using 
it as a policy target (i.e., a target set to achieve specific policy objectives). That is, I 
hypothesize that the change in the relationship is an instance of Goodhart’s Law: “any   2 
observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for 
control purposes.”
1
This hypothesis is at odds with the conventional view of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Modern analyses of the effectiveness of monetary policy are 
based on the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates (EH). The EH 
provides the link between the policy-determined overnight interest rate and longer-term 
interest rates that matter for economic decisionmaking. As an alternative to the EH, I 
offer a classical theory of interest rates and provide evidence from a variety of sources 
that is consistent with the classical theory and supports the hypothesis of the conundrum 
advanced here. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 presents the 
bond yield conundrum. Section 3 investigates when the change in the relationship 
occurred by investigating the relationship between the funds rate and the 10-year 
Treasury yield over the period from January 1983 through March 2007. This 
investigation reveals that the marked change in the relationship between these rates 
occurred in the late 1980s, far in advance of Greenspan’s observation. Section 4 reviews 
previous attempts to account for the conundrum and possible alternative economic 
explanations for it. Section 5 presents the fund-rate-targeting hypothesis (FRTH), which 
hypothesizes that the change in the relationship occurred because the FOMC began 
targeting the funds rate for policy purposes. Section 6 presents documentary evidence 
that the FOMC switched from using the federal funds rate as an operational target to a 
                                                 
1 Goodhart (1975). Chrystal and Mizen (2003) argue that Goodhart’s law and the far more influential Lucas 
critique are essentially the same. I have chosen to focus on Goodhart’s law because, from its origin, it has 
been narrowly associated with monetary policy, while the Lucas critique is broader in scope.   3 
policy target in the late 1980s. Section 7 tests several implications of the FRTH, and 
Section 8 concludes. 
2.0  The Bond Yield Conundrum 
The word conundrum was used by Alan Greenspan to describe the behavior of 
bond yields relative to the federal funds rate in testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on February 17, 2005, when he 
observed that 
long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the 
Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 
basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which 
suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates 
are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. The simple 
mathematics of the yield curve governs the relationship between short- 
and long-term interest rates. Ten-year yields, for example, can be thought 
of as an average of ten consecutive one-year forward rates. A rise in the 
first-year forward rate, which correlates closely with the federal funds rate, 
would increase the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes even if the more-




Greenspan went on to argue that (i) only a portion of the decline in 
nominal forward rates could be attributed to a decline in long-run inflation 
expectations, (ii) suggestions that forward real rates had declined were 
inconsistent with the rise in stock prices and the narrowing of credit spreads over 
this period, and (iii) domestic explanations, such as weak credit demand and the 
eagerness of foreigners to lend in the U.S., were inconsistent with the fact that 
“bond yields and risk spreads have narrowed globally.”
3
                                                 
2 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan (2005). 
 He also noted that, while 
a larger share of world savings was being lent across borders and that favorable 
inflation performance in a number of countries had likely reduced both 
3 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan (2005).   4 
expectations of inflation and inflation risk premiums, “none of this is new and 
hence it is difficult to attribute the long-term interest rate declines of the last nine 
months to glacially increasing globalization. For the moment, the broadly 
unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum.”
4
Greenspan’s discussion of long-term yields led some analysts to view the 
conundrum as purely a long-term-yield phenomenon. However, the 10-year yield 
in February 2005 was not unusually low by historical standards. Moreover, the 
behavior of any particular rate can be considered unusual only relative to the 
behavior of other rates. As Kuttner (2006) noted, “what is unusual about the 
2004-05 episode is that bond yields remained relatively unchanged, despite the 
Fed’s campaign to raise interest rates.”
 
5
3.0  When Did The Relationship between the Funds and Treasury Rates 
Change? 
 That yields in other countries also 
remained low about this time may not be particularly unusual given the 
predominant role of the U.S. in the world economy and the integration of 
financial markets internationally. This analysis focuses solely on the relationship 
among rates in the U.S. 
 
The conundrum is a change in the relationship between the federal funds 
rate and Treasury bond yields. While Greenspan noticed the change in the 
relationship shortly after the FOMC began increasing its target for the funds rate 
in June 2004, the change could have occurred earlier. What Greenspan noticed 
was a marked difference in the relationship between changes in the funds rate and 
changes in Treasury bond yields. Specifically, Treasury yields declined slightly 
                                                 
4 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan (2005), emphasis added. 
5 Kuttner (2006), p. 123.   5 
despite a 150 basis point increase in the funds rate. Hence, a natural way to 
investigate when the relationship changed is to estimate the equation 
(1)  10t tt T ff αβ η ∆ = +∆ +. 
This equation is estimated using monthly data over the period January 1983 
through March 2007. The beginning of the period was chosen because Thornton 
(2006) shows that the FOMC began paying increased attention to the federal 
funds rate in its policy deliberations in late 1982. The starting date also coincides 
with the onset of the great moderation (e.g., McConnell and Perez Quiros, 2000). 
The end of the period was chosen so the results would not be affected by the 
financial market crisis that began in the summer of 2007. 
As an initial step, Equation 1 is estimated using a 33-month rolling-
window regression. The window size is equal to the number of months from July 
2004 to March 2007—the period of the Greenspan conundrum. The estimates are 
presented in Figure 1. The data are plotted on the initial month of the sample. The 
estimates of β  fluctuate in a relatively small range around 0.40 until the early 
1990s, then decline. The estimates are negative for a period during the latter part 
of the sample. However, the estimate of 
2 R  has been essentially zero since the 
mid-1990s, suggesting that the conundrum may have occurred well in advance of 
Greenspan’s observation. Indeed, the relationship between the 10-year Treasury 
yield and the funds rate that characterized the 1980s and early 1990s appears to 
have essentially vanished sometime during the mid-1990s. 
 
   6 
3.1 The Relationship at the Quarterly Frequency 
In order to investigate the possibility that the 10-year yield may simply 
have responded more slowly to changes in the funds rate after the mid-1990s, 
Equation 1 is estimated using quarterly data. The sample period, 1983.Q1 through 
2007.Q1, consists of 97 observations. When Equation 1 is estimated using the 46 
observations from 1983.Q1 through 1994.Q2, the results are very similar to those 
obtained over a comparable period using monthly data. Specifically, the estimate 
of β  is 0.569 with a t-statistic of 5.19 and 
2 0.366 R = .
6
β
 When Equation 1 is 
estimated over the period 1994.Q3 through 2007.Q1, however, the estimate of   
declines to 0.129 and is statistically insignificant with a t-statistic of 1.095. 
Moreover, as was the case with monthly data, the estimate of 
2 R  is essentially 
zero (0.004). Hence, the marked deterioration in the relationship between the 10-
year Treasury yield and the funds rate at the monthly frequency cannot be 
accounted for simply by a slower response of the long-term yield.
7
3.2 When Did the Change Occur? 
 
The results suggest that the conundrum occurred much earlier than 2005, 
when Greenspan first observed it. To more precisely date the beginning of the 
conundrum, Andrews’ (1993) “supremum” method of identifying a single 
endogenous break point is used to determine the most likely date of a change. 
Specifically, Equation 1 is estimated over the first 45 months of the entire sample 
                                                 
6 The standard errors are obtained using a heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix 
estimator. 
7 The results are essentially the same if the equation is estimated using monthly data with lags of the federal 
funds rate. Using contemporaneous funds rate and 2 lags, the estimate of 
2 R  is 0.21 when estimated from 
January 1983 through June 1994 and essentially zero when estimated from July 1994 through March 2007. 
Moreover, the conclusion is essentially unchanged if the number of lags is increased to 5.   7 
and the remaining 246 months and the likelihood ratio statistic for the hypothesis 
of no structural break is calculated. The procedure is repeated, adding one month 
to the first period and deleting one month from the second period until there are 
246 months in the first period and 45 months in the second. The most likely break 
point is given by the largest value (i.e., the supremum) of the likelihood ratio 
statistics. Following the suggestion of Diebold and Chen (1996), a bootstrap 
approximation to the finite sample distribution of the test statistic is used to test 
the null hypothesis of no break. 
The likelihood ratio test statistic for all possible break dates is presented in 
Figure 2, along with the critical value for the 5.0 percent significance level 
obtained from 10,000 replications of the sample data under the null hypothesis 
using a sample size of 291 observations. The supremum of the likelihood ratio test 
statistic occurred on May 1988. The likelihood ratio test statistic is over 25, much 
larger than even the 1-percent critical value of 18.58. The results indicate that a 
statistically significant break in the relationship between the 10-year Treasury 
yield and the federal funds rate occurred even earlier than the rolling regression 
estimates appear to suggest. While the supremum occurred in May 1988, there is 
another sharp spike in the likelihood ratio statistic in mid-1994, which coincides 
with the sharp drop in 
2 R  using either monthly or quarterly data observed 
previously. 
The May 1988 break date is supported by estimates of Equation 1 over the 
two periods. When the equation is estimated over the period from January 1983 
through May 1988, the estimate of β  is 0.48 with a t-statistic of 3.0 and the   8 
estimate of 
2 R  is 0.21. When the equation is estimated over the period June 1988 
through March 2007, the estimate of β  is 0.18 with a t-statistic of 2.3; however, 
the estimate of 
2 R  (0.02) suggests that there is essentially no relationship between 
changes in these rates. 
3.3 Why Did the Change Go Unnoticed For So Long? 
 
If the conundrum that Greenspan noticed in 2005 actually occurred in the late 
1980s, it is reasonable to ask: Why did it take so long to notice such a marked change in 
the relationship? A possible answer is that the relationship was masked by a predominant 
downward trend in the levels of these rates over the period. Figure 3 shows the levels of 
the federal funds rate and 10-year Treasury yield over the sample period. These rates are 
dominated by a downward trend. The negative trend likely reflects a downward drift of 
inflation expectations and a reduction in inflation risk premium associated with the 
FOMC’s evolution to (implicit) inflation targeting. It could also reflect a reduction in the 
real-rate risk premium associated with the Great Moderation (e.g., Bernanke, 2004). In 
any event, the existence of a common trend in rates could mask the change in the 
relationship, documented in Section 3, on the level of rates, hence, account for the fact 
that the marked change in the relationship noted above went unnoticed for so long. 
Inflation expectations and inflation and real-rate risk premiums are 
unobservable, so that any attempt to adjust rates using estimates of such factors is 
subject to considerable uncertainty. Consequently, the effect of such latent factors 
is accounted for by removing the common trends from the rates. Specifically, the 





tt i trend trend δδ δ ε = ++ + ,   9 
where  t i ff =  or  10 T . The latent-factor-adjusted levels of the rates are given by 
estimates of 
i
t ε . The two equations are estimated over the entire sample period 
with the cross-equation restrictions  11
ij δδ =  and  22
ij δδ =  imposed. These 
restrictions are innocuous. The Chi-square statistics for the test of the hypotheses 
11
ij δδ =  and  22
ij δδ =  are 0.50 and 0.09, respectively. Hence, there is no important 
or statistically significant difference in the persistent effect of latent factors on 
these rates over the sample period. 
The latent-factor-adjusted federal funds and 10-year Treasury rates are 
presented in Figure 4.
8 The vertical line indicates May 1988. Consistent with the 
Andrews test results, there appears to be a marked change in the relationship 
between these latent-factor-adjusted rates that occurs around May 1988.
9
4.0   Previous Attempts to Resolve the Conundrum 
 Prior to 
May 1988 the funds rate and the 10-year yield are highly correlated and follow 
relatively closely along essentially the same cycle. After May 1988 the funds rate 
and the 10-year yield move very differently, frequently having different cycles. 
This section reviews several attempts to resolve the conundrum and discusses 
possible economic explanations for the empirical failure of the EH, which might account 
for the conundrum. 
4.1 Previous Attempts to Resolve the Conundrum 
Kim and Wright (2005) investigate the bond yield conundrum by decomposing 
the term structure of nominal interest rates into the expected future short-term rate and 
                                                 
8 Differences in the estimate of the intercepts for the trend equation is an estimate of the average relative 
risk premium, which is 147 basis points. 
9 The timing of the change is confirmed by Andrews test. The supremum of the test occurs at April 1987; 
however, the test statistic is relatively flat between April 1987 and May 1988.   10 
the term premium using the three-factor, arbitrage-free, term structure model of Kim and 
Orphanides (2005). They find that most of the decline in long-term interest rates from 
June 29, 2004, through July 20, 2005, was due to a decline in the term premium. While 
they do not identify the cause of the decline in the term premium, they conclude that the 
decline is due to “anything else that might affect the price of Treasury securities other 
than expected future monetary policy.”
10
Rosenberg (2007) decomposed the decline in the term premium from 
updated estimates of Kim and Wright’s (2005) model into (a) changes in risk, (b) 
risk aversion, and (c) foreign demand. He finds that only about half of the 
reduction in the term premium can be accounted for by these factors, with most 
accounted for by a marked (but unexplained) reduction in risk aversion. 
 
There are two reasons to doubt that the change in the relationship documented in 
Section 3 can be accounted for by a decline in the 10-year Treasury risk premium. First, 
the change in the relationship is a relatively high-frequency phenomenon, i.e., it is a 
marked change in the relationship between monthly changes in these rates, which would 
seem difficult to account for by either a secular or one-time decline in the risk premium. 
Second, a secular decline in the risk premium for long-term Treasuries could cause the 
trends in the funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield to be markedly different, but as 
noted above, the trends are essentially identical. A one-time reduction in the risk 
premium should have little or no effect on the high-frequency relationship between these 
rates. 
Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006) investigate the conundrum by 
estimating two macro-finance models of the term structure. Such models integrate 
                                                 
10 Kim and Wright (2005), p. 7.   11 
standard macroeconomic analyses with an affine model of the term structure. 
They consider two models: the VAR-based model of Bernanke, Reinhart, and 
Sack (2004) and the “New Keynesian” model of Rudebusch and Wu (2007). The 
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack model is estimated over the period January 1984 
through December 2005. They compute the implications of the Rudebusch and 
Wu model for yields of all maturities through December 2005 based on 
parameters of the model estimated over the period January 1988 through 
December 2000. 
They find that the models’ residuals are relatively large during 2005 and 
conclude that “from the perspective of both models, the recent behavior of long-
term Treasury yields does represent a conundrum.”
11
They then investigate possible explanations for the conundrum by regressing the 
residuals from these models on the implied volatility in the longer-term Treasury market, 
the implied volatility from Eurodollar options, the implied volatility from options on the 
S&P 500, the 8-quarter trailing standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP, the 24-
month trailing standard deviation of core PCE inflation, and the 12-month change in the 
custodial holdings by the New York Fed for all foreign official institutions, normalized 
by the total stock of Treasury debt held by the public. They find that over 50 percent of 
the residual is unexplained using the Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack model and over 70 
percent is unexplained using the Rudebusch and Wu model. The change in implied 
volatility of longer-term Treasury yields had the most explanatory power for the residuals 
of either model. Moreover, they indicate that increased foreign demand plays “little or no 
role” in explaining the conundrum. 
 
                                                 
11 Rudebusch, Swanson, and Wu (2006), p. 100.   12 
Smith and Taylor (2009) take a somewhat different approach. Specifically, 
they embed a model of the macro-economy consisting of a simple policy rule and 
an inflation equation that “describes how the interest affects inflation” into a 
standard affine term structure model. They do not estimate the model. Rather, 
they show analytically that “a monetary policy that reacts more aggressively 
against inflation implies that bond yields respond more aggressively to inflation 
as well.”
12 They then estimate a Taylor-type rule using 1- to 5-year zero-coupon 
Treasury yields and find that the coefficient on inflation is much higher for all 
five yields after 1983. Noting that Bernanke’s (2005) suggestion that long-term 
rates were low (relative to the funds rate) because of a global saving glut is 
inconsistent with the fact that the “world saving as a share of world GDP had 
actually fallen during this period,” they suggest an alternative explanation; 
namely, that “the funds rate deviated significantly from what would have been 
predicted by the Fed’s typical response as exemplified by the empirical estimates 
of the policy rule…for the sample period 1984.Q1 through 2006.Q4.”
13 Re-
estimating the policy rule over the period and including a multiplicative dummy 
variable on inflation for the period 2002.Q4 through 2000.Q5, they find that the 
coefficient on the multiplicative dummy is negative and highly statistically 
significant, “suggesting the possibility that the response coefficient on inflation 
dropped significantly during this period.”
14
                                                 
12 Smith and Taylor (2009), p. 910. 
 They conjecture that the decline in the 
response to inflation could account for Greenspan’s conundrum. Specifically, they 
suggest that “a perception of a smaller response coefficient in the policy rule 
13 Smith and Taylor (2009), p. 916. 
14 Smith and Taylor (2009), p. 916.   13 
could have led market participants to expect smaller interest rate responses to 
inflation in the future, and therefore lower long-term interest rate responses.”
15 
They go on to note that “while the shift was temporary when viewed from the 
perspective of today, it would have been difficult to assess at the time whether the 
Federal Reserve would have returned to the typical rule followed during the post 
1984.Q1 period.”
16
This explanation seems implausible. For one thing, for this explanation to 
be correct, market participants would have had to know (or believe) that the 
FOMC was following a specific Taylor rule, observe the change that Smith and 
Taylor document, and believe the change to be permanent rather than temporary. 
That this actually occurred seems unlikely. While the Taylor-type rule framework 
has been evolving since the mid-1990s, there is little evidence that the FOMC 
actually implemented policy using a Taylor-type rule framework (e.g., Asso et al., 
2010, and Meade and Thornton, 2010). 
 
More fundamentally, the only way the hypothesis could be consistent with 
the EH is if there was a marked decline in the term premium associated with 
change in the Taylor rule or if market participants believed that the increases in 
the FOMC’s funds rate target would be temporary. The latter seems improbable 
given that the funds rate target was being increased from a then historically low 
level and the well-documented persistence of changes in the FOMC’s funds rate 
target. 
                                                 
15 Smith and Taylor (2009), pp. 916-17. 
16 Smith and Taylor (2009), p. 917.   14 
Finally, the Greenspan conundrum was motivated by the observation that 
long-term yields changed little despite the FOMC increasing its funds rate target 
by 150 basis points over a period of six months—an aggressive tightening of 
policy. Moreover, long-term yields continued to change little despite an additional 
250-basis-point increase in the FOMC’s funds rate target. Hence it seems unlikely 
that the 10-year Treasury yield would fail to respond to a 400-basis-point increase 
in the funds rate because market participants believed that the FOMC would 
respond less to inflation than it did previously. 
4.2 Economic Explanations for the Empirical Failure of the EH 
Because Greenspan’s conundrum statement was essentially a statement 
about the failure of the EH, it is possible that it could be accounted for by 
economic theories of the failure of the EH. One such hypothesis, advanced by 
Fuhrer (1996), is similar to that suggested by Smith and Taylor (2009). Rather 
than observing a change in behavior of the Fed’s reaction function and assuming 
that market participants believed the change to be permanent, Fuhrer hypothesizes 
that the EH fails because of unexpected changes in the policy rate. Specifically, 
Fuhrer (1996) showed that the pseudo 10-year Treasury yield based on the pure 
EH and expectations of the federal funds rate obtained from a four-variable VAR 
model—consisting of the federal funds rate, the inflation rate, the output gap, and 
the 10-year Treasury yield—deviated significantly from the actual 10-year yield. 
Noting that the constant-coefficient VAR implied fixed coefficients in the Fed’s 
reaction function for setting the short-term interest rate, Fuhrer (1996) suggested 
that the failure of the EH could be due to the inability to predict the federal funds   15 
rate because of unexpected changes in policy. He then showed that there was a 
non-constant coefficient reaction function that could yield forecasts of the short-
term rate such that the EH-consistent 10-year yield based on these forecasts more 
closely resembled the observed 10-year yield. Fuhrer’s forecasts were based on 
the assumption that market participants had perfect knowledge of the reaction 
function, but that shifts in policymakers’ reaction function were unpredictable. 
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001, 2005) use an implication of Fuhrer’s 
simulations—that the historical failure of the EH is due to the market participants’ 
inability to predict changes in the process that generates the short-term rate—to 
account for the EH’s failure. They do this by simulating two macro models. The 
models assume that policymakers determine their target for the short-term rate 
based on a Taylor-type rule and that market participants form expectations for the 
short-term rate based on policy rule. Markets participants are assumed to know 
the parameters of the policy rule. The models differ in only one respect. One 
model assumes that market participants know the Fed’s inflation target with 
certainty. The other assumes that the inflation target is unknown and agents adjust 
their perception of the target based on a constant gain learning algorithm. 
Not surprisingly, they find that conventional tests of the expectations 
hypothesis fare much better when the market knows the inflation target, i.e., when 
market participants can forecast the future short-term rate more accurately, but not 
very well when the target is unknown, i.e., short-term interest rate forecasts are 
less accurate. Based on their analysis, they conjecture that “empirical rejections 
[of the EH] might reflect incorrect assumptions about expectations formation   16 
rather than incorrect assumptions about the theoretical link between long rates and 
short rates.”
17
It is well known that the EH is directly linked to market participants’ 
ability to predict the future short-term rate; however, it seems unlikely that the 
conundrum is a consequence of the unexpected shifts in the Fed’s reaction 
function or increased uncertainty about the FOMC’s inflation target. During the 
period when Greenspan first noticed the conundrum, the FOMC was using what is 
commonly referred to as “forward guidance.” Specifically, the FOMC announced 
that would increase its funds rate target at a “measured pace.” Consequently, 
knowledge of the future path of the funds rate target should have been at an all-
time high.  
 
Moreover, more was known about the FOMC’s implicit inflation objective 
than any time previously. More generally, it is well documented that the period 
since the early 1980s is a period of continuously increasing Federal Reserve 
transparency. Hence, it is difficult to see how the change in the relationship 
between the funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield documented in Section 3 
could stem from greater monetary policy uncertainty. 
As noted in Section 3, the conundrum is more obvious when the effects of 
latent factors that commonly affect rates are removed and that the change in the 
relationship occurs at the monthly and quarterly frequencies. Uncertainty about 
the FOMC’s inflation target could be an explanation of the change documented in 
Section 3 only if market participants believed the FOMC changed its inflation 
target frequently and in either direction, which seems implausible. Finally, these 
                                                 
17 Kozicki and Tinsely (2005), p. 444.   17 
explanations rest on the FOMC following a fixed policy rule since the early 
1980s, which as noted above, appears unlikely. 
5.0  The Funds Rate Targeting Explanation for the Conundrum 
 
This section proposes the FRTH to account for the conundrum 
documented in the Section 3. This hypothesis requires a different theory of the 
term structure of interest rates than the EH, which dominates the modern 
monetary policy literature. Hence, the analysis begins with the discussion of the 
conventional theory of the yield curve and an alternative classical theory. 
5.1 The Conventional Theory of the Treasury Yield Curve 
Modern macro-finance sees Treasury bond yields as being determined in 
accordance with the EH. Specifically, Treasury yields are determined by the 
market participants’ expectation for the short-term rate over the term of the long-
term asset plus a constant risk premium. Indeed, Greenspan’s conundrum 
statement is essentially an observation that long-term yields did not behave in a 
manner consistent with the EH: Treasury yields failed to increase despite a 
significant increase in the FOMC’s target for the funds rate. According to the EH, 
this could have occurred only if a) the Fed’s actions were anticipated, b) the 
increase in the target was expected to be temporary, or c) there was a marked 
change in the term premium. None of these seems likely. Treasury yields did not 
increase significantly in advance of the Fed’s actions. It is unlikely that market 
participants would have anticipated a rapid and significant reversal of the funds 
rate target. Moreover, there is no creditable argument for why the term premium 
should have changed quickly and dramatically and, as noted above, it is difficult   18 
to see how a change in the risk premium could account for the changes document 
in Section 3.  
The EH has been rejected using a wide variety of interest rates, sample 
periods, monetary policy regimes, etc. (e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1991; Bekaert 
and Hodrick, 2001; Thornton, 2005; Thornton and Kool, 2004; Sarno, Thornton, 
and Valente, 2007, and references therein). As Kozicki and Tinsely (2005) note, 
the widespread empirical failure of the EH need not imply a rejection of the idea 
that long-term investors are forward looking. Indeed, Guidolin and Thornton 
(2010) suggest that failure of the EH is likely due to the fact that it is nearly 
impossible to predict short-term interest rates beyond their current level, rather 
than because of a fundamental flaw in the theory or well-known econometric 
problems associated with commonly used tests of the EH. Consistent with 
Guidolin and Thornton’s (2010) findings, Andersson and Hofmann (2009), 
Goodhart and Lim (2008), and Rudebusch (2007) show that neither central 
bankers nor markets participants are able to predict the future path of the central 
bank’s policy rate beyond a few months. 
5.2 An Alternative (Classical) Theory of the Term Structure 
The EH remains the dominant paradigm for the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism because, as Fuhrer (1996) suggests, the “tendency to fall 
back on the paradigm [the EH] is so strong because candidates to replace it are so 
weak.”
18
                                                 
18 Fuhrer (1996), p. 1183. 
 Hence, I propose what I believe is essentially a classical theory of the 
term structure (e.g., Humphrey 1983a,b). The classical theory presented here is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the EH, if the empirical failure of the EH is a   19 
consequence of market participants’ inability to forecast short-term rates 
appreciably beyond their current level (e.g., Guidolin and Thornton, 2010, and 
references therein). The EH is relevant for monetary policy only if market 
participants can make reasonably good predictions of the future short-term rate. 
Classical economists generally believed that the structure of interest rates 
was anchored at the long-end of the term structure rather than at the short-end of 
the term structure as implied by the EH. “The” interest rate in classical analyses 
was an unobservable long-term rate, which was determined by basic economic 
forces—productivity, thrift, the rate of time preference, the marginal efficiency of 
capital, etc. In the short-run, observed long-term rates could deviate from the 
unobservable long-term rate determined by economic fundamentals for a variety 
of reasons. However, arbitrage would keep long-term rates from deviating too far 
from the fundamental rate for too long. 
Classical economists did not have a specific theory of the structure of 
rates. Short-term interest rates were thought to be determined by current economic 
and financial market conditions; however, arbitrage would keep short-term rates 
from deviating from long-term rates over the long run. For example, if short-term 
rates deviate too far above (below) the long-term real rate, investors would have 
an incentive to lend (borrow) short and borrow (lend) long, causing short-term 
rates to rise (fall) and long-term rates to fall (rise). Within limits of differences in 
market participants’ expectations for economic fundamentals, current conditions 
in financial markets, investors’ tolerance for interest rate risks, etc., the 
relationship between long-term and short-term rates could vary over time.   20 
The supply of credit, primarily determined by saving and changes in the 
stock of high-powered money, was thought to be relatively inelastic in the short 
run. During periods of economic expansion when the expected return to 
investment in real capital was high, long-term rates would rise, causing the entire 
structure of rates to shift up. Given the inelastic supply of credit, long-term rates 
would tend to rise relative to short-term rates, i.e., the yield curve would tend to 
become steeper. During periods of weak investment opportunities, long-term rates 
would decline, pushing the entire rate structure lower. Given the relative 
inelasticity of credit supply, however, long-term rates would tend to fall relative 
to short-term rates so the yield curve would tend to flatten. If investment 
opportunities were particular weak (such as during and leading up to recession), 
the yield curve could invert. Inversions of the yield curve would be relatively rare, 
however, because investors were assumed to be risk adverse, i.e., the rate of time 
preference was assumed to be positive: All other things the same, investors 
require a term or risk premium for investing longer-term. 
5.3 The Funds-Rate-Targeting Hypothesis 
This section shows how, given the classical theory of the term structure 
and efficiency of financial markets, a shift to funds rate targeting for policy 
purposes could alter the relationship between the funds rate and Treasury yields. 
To see how, assume that the equilibrium federal funds rate ( ff ) and the 10-year 
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where  t r  denote the natural real rate of interest, i.e., the classical unobservable 
long-term real rate, and 
e
t π  and 
e
t π
′ allows for the possibility that the expected 
rate of inflation relevant for the federal funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield 
might be different. 
ff
t rp  and 
10 T
t rp  denote non-zero risk premiums that are unique 
to each rate. Because Treasuries are void of default risk, 
10 T
t rp  reflects a market-
risk premium to compensate lenders for lending long. The overnight federal funds 
rate is essentially void of market risk, so 
ff
t rp  represents a default-risk premium. 
t µ  and  t µ′ reflect potential premiums or discounts that are due to unique 
characteristics of the particular market. For example, only institutions that hold 
deposits with the Federal Reserve can participate directly in the federal funds 
market. Likewise, the price of 10-year Treasuries may reflect a discount because 
they are “on-the-run.” 
Given Equation (3), changes in interest rates will reflect the response of 
rates to changes in the economic fundamentals and shocks to factors that are 














where  t F ∆  is the change in economic fundamentals, e.g., changes in the natural 
rate of interest, changes in inflation expectations, or changes in the inflation or 
real risk premiums. The terms 
ff
t ε  and 
10 T
t ε  are zero-mean, constant variance 
shocks to the factors that are unique to the particular rate. These shocks are 
uncorrelated with each other and with changes in economic fundamentals. The   22 
coefficientsθ  and ψ  reflect the fact that different rates are likely to respond 
differently to economic fundamentals.  
With both rates free to respond to news, the correlation between changes 
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F σ∆ , 
2
ff ε σ , and  10
2
T ε σ  denote the variances of changes in economic 
fundamentals and rate-specific shocks, respectively. The non-zero correlation is a 
consequence of the fact that both rates respond to economic fundamentals at the 
same time.
19 θ  The correlation will be positive if both   and ψ  have the same sign 
and negative if their signs are opposite. Given the fact that interest rates are 
positively related to the real rate, inflation expectations, etc., it is not surprising to 
see that changes in interest rates across the term structure tend to be positively 
correlated even at the daily frequency. 
Now assume instead that the FOMC targets the funds rate for policy 
purposes and that the funds rate remains close to the target level. In this case, the 
funds rate will be given by  
(6) 
T
ttt ff ff ζ = + , 
where 
T
t ff  denotes the FOMC’s target for the funds rate and  t ζ  denotes the 
control error. Given this assumption, changes in the funds rate and the 10-year 
yield can be expressed as 
                                                 
19 The correlation would be zero if and only if rates responded to different fundamentals, e.g., the funds rate 
responds only to changes in the natural rate, while the 10-year yield responds only to changes in expected 
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 Note that 
this correlation is zero if the . This covariance will be zero if 
the FOMC does not adjust its funds rate target quickly to changes in the economic 
fundamentals that the 10-yield responds to. 
Market rates respond to news each day. In contrast, if the FOMC is 
targeting the funds rate for policy purposes, the target will be adjusted relatively 
infrequently. For example, the funds rate target was maintained at 3.0 percent 
from September 4, 1992, until February 4, 1994, and at 1.0 percent from June 25, 
2003, to June 30, 2004. Moreover, it is common for the funds rate target to be 
constant for a period of a month or more. Indeed, since 1994 there were only 7 
occasions when the FOMC changed the target between regularly scheduled 
FOMC meetings. Indeed, the more slowly the FOMC adjusts the target to news 
and the less frequently it changes its target, the more likely the correlation will be 
small, perhaps zero. 
 
 
                                                 
20 This assumes that control shocks are uncorrelated with changes in economic fundamentals.   24 
6.0  Funds Rate Targeting in the 1970 and 1980 
The previous section advanced the FRTH of the conundrum, first noticed 
by Greenspan (2005), but documented here to have occurred in the late 1980s. It 
is well known, however, that the Fed targeted the federal funds rate from the mid 
to the late 1970s (e.g., Cook and Hahn, 1989; and Rudebusch, 1995). Hence, if 
the change in the relationship between the funds rate and the 10-year yield 
documented above is a consequence of funds rate targeting, the natural question 
is: Why was the relationship not changed in the 1970s? The answer to this 
question comes from the distinction between using the funds rate as an “operating 
target” and using it as a “policy target.” Specifically, the FOMC used the federal 
funds rate in the 1970s much differently than it does today. 
6.1 Funds Rate Targeting in the 1970s 
It is important to remember that in the early 1970s there was no wide-
spread acceptance of the view that monetary policy could control long-run 
inflation as there is today. For a variety of reasons, policymakers believed that the 
Fed’s ability to control inflation was limited (e.g., Nelson, 2005; Romer and 
Romer, 2002; and Thornton, 2010). More important, the FOMC was attempting to 
manipulate aggregate demand by affecting the growth rate of monetary 
aggregates, not by setting a target for the funds rate. Meulendyke (1998) describes 
the Fed’s funds rate operating procedure during the period 1970-79 this way: 
The techniques for setting and pursuing money targets developed 
gradually during the decade, with frequent experimentation and 
modification of procedures taking place in the first few years of the 
1970s. Nonetheless, until October 1979 the framework used by the 
FOMC for guiding open market operations generally included 
setting a monetary objective and encouraging the Federal funds   25 
rate to move gradually up or down if money was exceeding or 
falling short of the objective. The Federal funds rate, as an 
indicator of money market conditions, became the primary guide to 





The funds rate was used by the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (hereafter, Desk) as a guide for conducting daily open market 
operations. The target was not set to achieve specific FOMC policy objectives. If 
the funds rate began trading high relative to expectations, i.e., “the target,” the 
Desk would inject reserves. If it was low relative to expectations, reserves were 
drained. If the funds rate was persistently high or low relative to expectations, the 
“target” was adjusted. 
The FOMC’s “official funds rate objective,” as the FOMC then referred to 
its funds rate target, was adjusted frequently. Figure 5 shows the daily funds rate 
and Rudebusch’s (1995a,b) funds rate target over the period September 13, 1974, 
through September 19, 1979. Rudebusch reports 99 adjustments to the funds rate 
objective—an average of an adjustment every 2.5 weeks. This is hardly the 
behavior one would expect if the funds rate target were being used to implement 
monetary policy as it is today. Moreover, many of the changes in the funds rate 
target that Rudebusch reports were made by the Desk, not the FOMC. Indeed, the 
FOMC’s funds rate target was stated as a range of 50 to 75 basis points, not as a 
specific rate.
22
Finally, despite frequent target adjustments, differences of the funds rate 
from the funds rate objective were relatively large. The average absolute monthly 
 
                                                 
21 Meulendyke (1998), pp. 44-45. 
22 See the annual review of the FOMC published in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review from 
1975 through 1979.   26 
difference of the funds rate from the funds rate objective was 13 basis points, with 
a standard deviation of 28 basis points during the 1973-79 period. 
Because the funds rate was permitted to deviate significantly from the 
mid-point of the target range and adjustments to the funds rate objective were 
frequent, the funds rate effectively responded to news about economic 
fundamentals in much the same way as other market rates. Consequently, there is 
no reason to see a marked change in the relationship between the funds rate and 
the 10-year Treasury yield as a result of “funds rate targeting” during this period. 
Nevertheless, to test whether the relationship between the funds rate and 
the 10-year yield occurred even earlier, Andrews’ (1993) test was applied to a 
regression of the change in the 10-year Treasury yield on the change in the funds 
rate using monthly data from January 1974 through March 2007. Consistent with 
the above analysis, the test indicates a statistically significant break at May 1988. 
There is no indication of a break in the relationship during the 1970s and, 
importantly, even in the late 1970s when the FOMC greater emphasis on 
monetary aggregates in the implementation of monetary policy. 
6.2 Funds Rate Targeting in the 1980s 
Officially the FOMC replaced its nonborrowed reserves operating 
procedure with a borrowed reserves operating procedure when it deemphasized 
M1 in its monetary policy deliberations in October 1982. However, Thornton 
(2006) shows that unofficially the operating objective was the overnight federal 
funds rate. Initially, the FOMC “targeted” the funds rate in much the same way as 
it did during the pre-October 1979 period. For policy, the FOMC continued to   27 
focus on monetary aggregates (primarily M2 and, to a lesser extent, M3). The 
funds rate was used as an operating objective, similar to how it was used in the 
mid- to late 1970s. In discussing the FOMC’s practice from “1983 to the late 
1980s,” Meulendyke (1998) notes, the Committee adjusted its operating objective 
up or down, “whenever money seemed to be deviating significantly from the 
desired growth path.”
23
The FOMC shifted from using the funds rate as an operating target to 
using it as a policy target, as policymakers became increasingly skeptical of the 
usefulness of monetary aggregates for policy purposes. For example, at the 
February 10, 1988, meeting, Greenspan noted that “there has been more data 
mining with the monetary aggregates in the last two years than I’ve seen with any 
other set of data in my whole life. And whenever you get to that, you know that 




Thornton (2006) documents that discussions of the extent to which the 
Committee was targeting the funds rate and the desirability of doing so occurred 
frequently in 1988 and Committee members became increasingly open about the 
extent to which they were focusing on the funds rate in their policy deliberations. 
 
The transcripts of FOMC meetings make it clear that the funds rate was 
being used as a policy target by early 1988. For example, on May 9, 1988, the 
funds rate objective was increased from 6.75 percent to 7.0 immediately 
following a May 6, 1988, conference call. There is no transcript of this conference 
                                                 
23 Meulendyke (1998), p. 53.  
24 FOMC Transcript, February 10, 1988, p. 44.   28 
call; however, the discussion at the May 17, 1988, FOMC meeting indicates that 
the increase was in response to concerns about inflation.
25
at this particular stage in the cycle, if we are running into the type of 
acceleration and inflationary process which is at the forefront of our 
concerns…I don’t think there is any question that the next move that we 
have to make is on the upside. And the only question, basically, is whether 
we do it now or we do it before the next FOMC meeting on the basis of 
certain contingencies.
 Chairman Greenspan 




Most FOMC participants continued to use the code of incremental changes in the 
borrowing assumption; however, others were more candid. For example, concerned about 
small incremental moves in the funds rate target in the current environment, President 
Melzer noted  
at some point we’re going to have to step out in front of this situation if 
everything we’ve heard today is correct. And that’s going to take 
something more on the order of alternative C. The timing issue has been 
talked about. I would guess…that if you [Chairman Greenspan] had the 
benefit of all this discussion you might have moved it a full 50 basis points 
[referring the 25-basis-point increase in the funds rate target on May 9], 




Greenspan summarized the Committee’s views by stating 
there seems to be a consensus for alternative B and asymmetrical 
language, with a fairly strong willingness—desire, if I can put it that 
way—to give instructions to the Chairman and the Desk to move before 
the next period. I would interpret that to mean that, unless we see events 
which clearly are contrary to the general consensus of the outlook as one 
hears it today, it’s almost an automatic increase. There is a strong, and I 
                                                 
25 It is interesting to note that Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002), who examined the Credit Market 
column of the Wall Street Journal two days before and after changes in the Fed’s funds rate objective to 
determine whether the market was aware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate or that the funds rate 
target had changed, found that “the first time in the 1980s that market participants knew that policy 
action occurred was May 9, 1988, when the Desk injected fewer reserves than analysts expected. This 
action sparked speculation that the Fed was increasing its fight against inflation, and market analysts 
concluded that the action would cause the funds rate to trade at 7 percent or slightly higher.” Poole, 
Rasche, and Thornton (2002), p. 73. 
26 FOMC Transcript, May 17, 1988, p. 1.  There is no available transcript for the first part of this meeting. 
27 FOMC Transcript, May 17, 1988, p. 10.   29 
think convincing, case that is being made that we should not, under any 





Consistent with this statement, Greenspan increased the funds rate target from 7.0 
to 7.25 percent on May 25. Fears of accelerating inflation prompted the FOMC to 
increase the funds rate target another 250 basis points by February 24, 1989. 
This shift toward using the funds rate as a policy target also corresponds 
well with the Asso et al. (2010) documentation of the increased interest among 
Fed policymakers in the Taylor rule in the mid 1990s and the trend toward using a 
short-term interest rate to implement policy decisions in other central banks. 
The change in the FOMC’s use of the funds rate is further evidenced by 
the behavior of the funds rate target during the first half of 1989. Short-term 
market rates, such as the 3-month T-bill rate, peaked in late March 1989 and 
began to fall. Nevertheless, concerned about inflation, the FOMC made a small, 
6.25-basis-point increase in the funds rate target on May 17, 1989. More 
importantly, the FOMC did not reduce its target for the funds rate despite a sharp 
drop in other rates. For example, between March 27 and June 6, 1989 (the date of 
the FOMC’s first 25-basis-point cut in the funds rate target), the 3-month T-bill 
rate declined 96 basis points and the 10-year Treasury yield declined 112 basis 
points.
29
At the conference call on June 5, 1989, Greenspan announced that he was 
requesting the Desk to adjust the borrowing objective to bring the funds rate down 
25 basis points. In response to one Committee member’s concern about the 
 
                                                 
28 FOMC Transcript, May 17, 1988, p. 10. 
29 For a more detailed analysis of this period see Thornton (2004).   30 
“urgency” of the move given uncertainty about inflation and the strength of the 
economy, Greenspan responded that his “major concerns are (a) the money supply 
data and (b) evidence that is emerging that the commodity price inflation is 
beginning to subdue.”
30
total reserves decreased by $0.89 billion during the period from 
February to May. This is the largest three-month decline in total 
reserves in the entire period from January 1959 to March 1995.  
This is remarkable because consecutive monthly decreases in 
reserves are uncommon owing to the need to increase the monetary 
base to meet the growing demand for currency. The effect of these 
actions on banks was direct and substantial. M1—which had been 
growing at about a 3.5% rate during the previous year—declined 
by $11 billion between February and June 1989.
 Consistent with Greenspan’s concern, Thornton (2004) 




The behavior of reserves and M1 is consistent with the idea that the FOMC was 
using the funds rate as a policy target. To maintain the target in the face of 
declining interest rates, the Fed had to drain a significant amount of reserves, 
which produced a correspondingly large decline in M1. Concerned about the 
effects of such an atypical decline in M1 on the real economy, Greenspan opted to 
adjust the funds rate target, but only when the effect of the Fed’s restrictive 
actions on the monetary aggregates became sufficiently large. 
In contrast, when questioned at the February 10, 1988, FOMC meeting 
about why he reduced the funds rate target by 25 basis points on January 28, 
1988, Greenspan noted that he did so in part because “the markets were coming 
down on their own at that particular time—clearly trying to seek a somewhat 
                                                 
30 Transcript FOMC Conference Call (1989), p. 3. 
31 Thornton (2004), p. 494.   31 
lower market rate level.”
32
The marked change in the Committee’s emphasis on the funds rate is 
evidenced in the monthly average difference in the daily funds rate from the funds 
rate target present in Figure 6. The vertical line denotes May 1988. Beginning 
about May 1988, the FOMC appears to increase its control over the funds rate. 
The average absolute difference between the funds rate and the funds rate 
objective during the 65 months between January 1983 and May 1988 is 16 basis 
points—about the same as during the 1970s. Moreover, the funds rate objective 
was adjusted frequently—36 times, an average of once every 1.8 months. In 
contrast, the average absolute difference during the 68 months from June 1988 
through January 1994 was just 7 basis points. The target was also adjusted less 
frequently—30 times, an average of once every 2.25 months. After the FOMC 
began the practice of announcing policy actions in February 1994, the absolute 
difference became even smaller and target changes less frequent. The absolute 
average difference from February 1994 through March 2007 was just 2.6 basis 
points, and there were 49 target changes, an average of one every 3.25 months. 
 In this case, the change in the target was essentially an 
endogenous response to a change in interest rates. 
7.0  Evidence of the FTRH 
 
The previous section documents that the FOMC began using the funds rate 
to implement monetary policy in the late 1980s, about the time of the marked 
change in the relationship between the funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield 
occurred. This section provides empirical evidence from a variety of sources that 
                                                 
32 FOMC Transcript, February 10, 1988, p. 50.   32 
supports the hypothesis that the change in the FOMC’s use of the funds rate 
accounts for the change in the relationship between these rates. 
7.1 The Relationships of the Federal Funds and 10-Year Yield and Other 
      Rates  
 
If the change in the relationship between the federal funds rate and the 10-
year yield is a consequence of the FRTH, there should also be a noticeable effect 
on the relationship between the federal funds rate and other Treasury rates as well. 
Moreover, given that arbitrage is stronger the closer the term to maturity of two 
assets, the FRTH suggests that there should be a noticeable change in the 
relationship between the rate on 10-year Treasuries and shorter-term Treasury 
rates as well. 
Figure 7 presents estimates of 
2 R  from 33-month rolling regressions of 
changes in each of five Treasury rates (the 3- and 6-month T-bill rates,  3 tb  and 
6 tb , and the 1-, 5-, and 10-year Treasury yields,  1 T ,  5 T , and  10 T ) on changes in 
the federal funds rate. The estimates are plotted on the first month in the sample. 
As expected, there is a noticeable decline in the estimates of 
2 R  in the early 
1990s for each of the five Treasury rates. Estimates of 
2 R  for 5- and 10-year 
Treasury yields behave similarly, both remaining at zero after the early 1990s. 
The estimates for the other Treasury rates also decline dramatically and become 
much more variable. 
Figure 8 shows the estimates of 
2 R  from regressions of changes in the 10-
year yield on each of the rates. The funds rate is included for comparison. There is 
no obvious change in the relationships with the 10-year Treasury yield until the 
late 1990s. The estimates of 
2 R  cycle around a non-zero average level until the   33 
late 1990s, when all of the estimates decline briefly and subsequently rise. The 
estimates for  3 tb  and  6 tb  go to zero for a period at the beginning of 2000, but 
become positive toward the end of the sample period. The estimates for  1 T  and 
5 T  never become negative. Indeed, the relationship between the 5- and 10-year 
Treasury yields is the least affected. 
To investigate whether the changes noted in Figures 7 are statistically 
significant and to get an estimate of the date the changes occurred, Andrews’ 
(1993) test is applied to regressions of changes in each of the Treasury rates on 
changes in the funds rate. As before, the sample period is January 1983 through 
March 2007 and the truncation is set at 45 observations. 
The Andrews’ test results for  3 tb ,  6 tb ,  1 T , and  5 T  are presented in the 
four panels of Figure 9, along with the corresponding bootstrapped 5% critical 
value of the test under the null hypothesis. All of the tests indicated that there was 
a statistically significant change in the relationship with the federal funds rate that 
occurred at or slightly before May 1988. However, the supremum for the test 
occurs later, in the early 2000s, for  3 tb ,  6 tb , and  1 T . For Treasury rates with 
maturities of a year or less the supremum occurs in the early 2000s, about the time 
when the FOMC reduced it funds rate target to what was then a historically low 
level and kept it there for a year. The 5-year yield has a local peak at May 1988; 
however, the slightly higher surpremum occurs at July 1989. 
The Andrews break point test was also applied to regressions of the 
change in the 10-year Treasury yield on the change in each of the other Treasury 
rates. These test results are reported in Figure 10. As with the federal funds rate,   34 
there is a statistically significant break in the relationship between the 10-year 
yield and the 3-month T-bill rate that occurs at May 1988. The other rates have 
local extremums at or near May 1988; however, there is no statistically significant 
break for  6 tb  or  1 T  even at the 10 percent significance level. There is also a local 
peak for  5 T  at June 1988, but the statistically significant break occurs near the 
period when the funds rate target was extremely low for an extended period of 
time. 
The above evidence is even stronger when all the rates are adjusted for the 
effect of the latent factors. This is done by estimating Equation (2) for all six rates 
and imposing the cross-equation restrictions  11
ij δδ =  and  22
ij δδ = , for all i and  j . 
These restrictions are innocuous. The Chi-square statistics for the tests of the 
hypotheses  11
ij δδ =  and  22
ij δδ =  are 1.78 and 0.25, respectively; neither is 
significant at conventional significance levels. Hence, there appears to be no 
important or statistically significant difference in the persistent effect of latent 
factors on any of the six interest rates over this sample period.
33
The four panels of Figure 11 plot the latent-factor-adjusted levels of 
  
3 tb , 
6 tb ,  1 T , and  5 T  with the latent-factor-adjusted federal funds rate. The vertical 
line denotes May 1988. Panel A shows no obvious break in the relationship with 
the 3-month T-bill rate. There is more evidence of a break in the relationship with 
the 6- and 12-month T-bill rates shown in Panels B and C. Specifically, the 
tendency of the contemporaneous correspondence of peaks and troughs in the 
rates prior to May 1988 is replaced by a tendency of turning points in the 
                                                 
33 As before, the results are nearly identical if the restrictions are not imposed.   35 
Treasury rates to precede turning points in the funds rate. Panel D presents the 
latent-factor-adjusted 5-year Treasury and funds rates. This figure is very similar 
to Figure 4 and shows a marked change in the behavior of these rates before and 
after May 1988. 
The four panels of Figure 12 present the latent-factor-adjusted 10-year 
Treasury yield with each of the other latent-factor-adjusted Treasury rates. The 
panels show a marked departure of the behavior of the 10-year yield and other 
rates after May 1988, with the effect being the greatest the larger the shorter the 
term to maturity. Indeed, the effect on the relationship with the 5-year yield is 
relatively modest, and consistent with results of Andrews’ test reported above, the 
relationship appears to be most different beginning about 2002. 
7.2 Temporal Ordering and the FRTH 
The FRTH is based on the assumption that when the Fed is not targeting 
the funds rate, all rates should respond to news simultaneously. However, when 
the FOMC is using the funds rate to implement policy, the funds rate will respond 
more slowly and, hence, lag changes in market rates. Moreover, given the strength 
of arbitrage between the funds rate and other short-term rates, the FRTH suggests 
that temporal ordering of shorter-term and longer-term Treasury rates could also 
be affected. 
These implications of the FRTH are investigated using a Granger causality 
test of temporal ordering. Granger causality tests were performed for all possible 
pairs of the six latent-factor-adjusted interest rates for the period before and after 
May 1988. The latent-factor-adjusted rates are used because the common   36 
response to the latent factors will bias the test toward no Granger causality. Also, 
given the sensitivity of the test to lag specification used (e.g., Thornton and 
Batten, 1985), the tests are performed using all possible combinations of lags 
from 2 to 6. 
The complete set of results is presented in Appendix A; however, to 
conserve space, Table 1 presents the number of times out of the 25 lag 
combinations that the null hypothesis was rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level or lower before and after May 1988. With one exception, the Granger 
causality tests indicate unidirectional temporal ordering from each of Treasury 
rates to the federal funds rate both before and after May 1988. The exception is 
for the 3-month T-bill rate where the hypothesis that the funds rate does not 
Granger-cause the 3-month T-bill rate was rejected at the 5 percent level for nine 
of the 25 lag specifications considered after May 1988. The fact that there is 
unidirectional temporal ordering before May 1988 suggests that the funds rate 
was somewhat slow to adjust news even when FOMC was using it as an 
operational guide for open market operations before 1988. While not evident from 
Table 1, qualitatively the evidence of unidirectional causality from Treasury rates 
to the funds rate is much stronger after May 1988, suggesting an even slower 
adjustment of the funds rate when the FOMC was using the funds rate to 
implement policy.  
Consistent with the classical theory of the term structure, there is no 
evidence of unidirectional causality between any pair of Treasury rates before   37 
May 1988. All of the latent-factor-adjusted Treasury rates respond simultaneously 
to news. 
The results change markedly after May 1988, however. After May 1988, 
there is strong evidence of unidirectional temporal ordering from longer-term 
Treasury rates to shorter-term Treasury rates, which is consistent with the 
classical notion that the structure of rates is anchored at the long end of the term 
structure. The hypothesis that the longer-term Treasury rate does not Granger-
cause the short-term Treasury rate is rejected for all or most of the 25 lag 
specifications considered, and the null hypothesis that the shorter-term Treasury 
rate does not Granger-cause the longer-term Treasury rate is either never rejected 
or rejected for a much smaller number of the lag lengths considered. 
These findings are consistent with the FRTH. When changes in economic 
fundamentals drive longer-term rates higher (or lower) the movement in shorter-
term Treasury rates is impeded by arbitrage, which causes shorter-term Treasury 
rates to adjust more slowly than when the FOMC was not using the funds rate to 
implement policy. 
7.3 The FRTH and the Effect of Target Changes 
If the FRTH is correct, the relationship between the 10-year Treasury yield 
and other Treasury rates should be also be affected by FOMC funds rate target 
changes. To test whether the relationships between changes in the 10-year yield 




ff ff no ff no ff
t t tt T jD jD αβ β η
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆= +∆ + ∆ +,   38 
is estimated for the four other Treasury rates. 
* ff D
∆  denotes a dummy variable that 




no ff ff DD
∆∆ = − . Because the data are monthly, 
* ff D
∆  is 1 for the 
month following a target change when the change occurred during the last three 
business days of the month. Otherwise, it is one during the month when the target 
was changed. 
Equation 9 is estimated over the sample periods January 1983–May 1988 
and June 1988 through March 2007. The results for the first period are presented 
in Panel A of Table 2. Consistent with the FRTH, the estimates of 
* ff β
∆  and 
* no ff β
∆  are similar for each of the four rates before May 1988. Indeed, the null 
hypothesis of equality is not rejected at any reasonable significance level. 
The results are very different after May 1988, however. The estimates of 
* ff β
∆  are smaller than the estimates of 
* no ff β
∆ . Indeed, the null hypothesis of 
equality is rejected for all four rates at the 5 percent significance level or lower. 
Also, for the 3-month, 6-month, and 1-year rates, the hypothesis that the estimate 
of 
* no ff β
∆  in the second sample is equal to the estimate of 
* no ff β
∆  in the first is not 
rejected. This suggests that the relationships between monthly changes in these 
Treasury rates and changes in the 10-year Treasury yield changed after May 1988 
only during months when the target was changed.
34
                                                 
34 Table 3 reports the test of equality of the estimate of 
 The null hypothesis is 
*
no ff β
∆  for the second sample period with the 
estimate of  β  from the equation,  10
t tt Ti αβ ε ∆ = +∆+.estimated over the first sample period. However,   39 
rejected, however, for the 5-year rate. Consistent with the Andrew test in Section 
5.3; however, the relationship between the 5- and 10-year yields changed 
significantly during the latter part of the second period. 
7.4 The FRTH and the Effect of Policy Actions 
If the change in the relationship between the funds rate and Treasury rates 
is the consequence of the FOMC targeting the funds rate, we should expect to see 
the relationships among rates affected most when the funds rate target is behaving 
unusually because of policy considerations. There are three episodes of interest. 
The first is in the late 1980s, when as noted previously, the FOMC was slow to 
adjust its funds rate target for the funds rate despite marked declines in long-term 
and short-term rates. 
The second occurred in the mid-to-late 1990s, when the FOMC kept the 
funds rate target essentially unchanged even as long-term rates declined 
significantly. Economic growth was strong and despite this fact, inflation had 
been declining and low. Greenspan attributed what appeared to be aberrant 
behavior of inflation relative to output growth to a rise in productivity. The 
Committee delayed policy actions even though Board of Governors’ staff 
forecasts, which were repeatedly wrong, were for rising inflation (e.g., Meade and 
Thronton, 2010). With economic growth strong and inflation subdued, 
policymakers were content to leave the funds rate target essentially unchanged 
during this period (e.g., Wheelock, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                                 
the qualitative conclusions are identical if the hypothesis that the estimate of 
*
no ff β
∆  for the first sample 
period is equal to the estimate of 
*
no ff β
∆ for the second sample period.   40 
The third occurred in 2001 when the FOMC reduced its funds rate target 
aggressively relative to long-term Treasury rates and maintained the target at the 
then historically low level of 1.0 percent from late June 2003 to late June 2004. 
With inflation expectations well anchored by the FOMC’s implicit inflation 
objective, the FOMC believed that it could be very aggressive in its efforts to 
increase employment following the 2001 recession. 
Evidence that the relationship between the Treasury rates and the funds 
rate changed more during these periods is presented in Figure 13, which plots the 
24-month rolling correlation between the latent-factor-adjusted federal funds rate 
and each of the latent-factor-adjusted Treasury rates. The figure shows that there 
was a marked decline in the correlation between the federal funds rate and each of 
the Treasury rates during each of these three episodes.
35
There is also a marked decline in the correlation between the latent-factor-
adjusted 10-year Treasury yield and each of the rates during these periods. This is 
shown in Figure 14, which plots the 24-month rolling correlation of each of the 
latent-factor-adjusted rates with the latent-factor-adjusted 10-year Treasury yield. 
Consistent with the Andrews test results noted previously, the most noticeable 
change in the relationship between the 5- and 10-year occurred when the sample 
includes the period when the FOMC maintained the funds rate target at 1.0 for 
about a year. 
 
7.5 The FRTH and the FOMC’s Reaction Function 
If the FRTH is correct, there should be a marked change in the relationship 
between the funds rate and variables that the FOMC might respond to in setting 
                                                 
35 The data are plotted on the first month in the sample.   41 
its target for the funds rate. Most theoretical models have FOMC setting the funds 
rate target in accordance with a Taylor-type rule. It is doubtful that the FOMC 
followed such a rule or even adopted rule-like behavior (e.g., Asso et al., 2010, 
and Meade and Thornton, 2010). Moreover, empirical Taylor rules do not fit the 
data very well unless they include the lagged federal funds rate, which is 
characterized as representing policy inertia (Woodford, 1999, 2003). However, 
there is little empirical (e.g., Rudebusch, 2002, 2006, 2007) or documentary (e.g., 
Asso et al., 2010) evidence that monetary policy was inertial during this period. 
While the FOMC has likely never followed a Taylor-type rule per se, there 
is little doubt that policymakers believed that they should adjust their policy rate 
lower to promote output growth and raise it to slow output growth and/or reduce 
inflation (e.g., Meade and Thornton, 2010). Hence, the approach taken here is to 
estimate the simple policy reaction function of the form,  
(10)  01 2
i
t t tt ff ip ur θθ θ ξ ∆= + +∆ +  , 
where  t ip   denotes the monthly growth rate of industrial production and  t ur ∆  
denotes the monthly change in the unemployment rate.
36
10 T ∆
 To ensure that Equation 
(10) is a policy reaction function rather than simply capturing reduced-form 
relationship between interest rates and these macro-variables, Equation (10) is 
also estimated with   as the dependent variable. If the equation simply 
reflects a reduced-form relationship between interest rates and these variables, the 
                                                 
36 The inflation rate or the inflation rate less the implied inflation target of 2.0 percent was initially 
included. The coefficients were negative, but never statistically significant at any reasonable significance 
level and, hence, not included here.   42 
relationships of the funds rate and the 10-year Treasury yield with these variables 
should be similar. 
Equation (10) is estimated using monthly data for periods before and after 
May 1988. The estimates for periods before and after May 1988 are presented in 
the top section of Table 3. There is a very weak relationship between changes in 
the funds rate and these macro-variables before 1988. Moreover, the relationship 
of the changes in the funds rate to these variables is nearly identical to that of 
changes in the 10-year Treasury yield. 
The results changed markedly after May 1988, however. After May 1988 
the macro-variables account for more than 25 percent of the variation of changes 
in the funds rate. However, as before May 1988, these variables account for 
essentially none of the variation of changes in the 10-year yield. These findings 
are consistent with the idea the FOMC was targeting the funds rate for economic 
stabilization purposes after May 1988 but not before. 
This conclusion is enhanced by estimating Equation (10) over two periods 
when the FOMC was aggressively changing the funds rate target for policy 
purposes. The first begins in late October 1990. At its October 2, 1990, meeting 
the FOMC noted that “economic activity expanded at a slow pace in the third 
quarter…however, data available thus far provide only limited evidence of a 
retarding effect [of a large increase in oil prices] on production and aggregate 
spending.”
37
                                                 
37 Federal Reserve Press Release, November 16, 1990, pp. 16 & 17. 
 The FOMC voted, with four dissents, to keep the funds rate target 
unchanged. The FOMC’s Record of Policy Actions, notes that Governor Seger 
dissented “because she favored an immediate easing,” while Governor Angell and   43 
Presidents Boykin and Hoskins dissented because “they were opposed to the 
easing of reserve conditions contemplated by the majority.”
38
The information reviewed at this meeting suggests a weakening in 
economic activity. Total nonfarm payroll employment declined further in 
October, reflecting sizable job losses in manufacturing and construction; 
the civilian unemployment rate held steady at 5.7 percent. Industrial 
production declined sharply in October after rising moderately during the 
summer.
 Consistent with the 
discussion of the October meeting, the funds rate target was reduced by 25 basis 
points on October 29 in an intermeeting move and by another 25 basis points at 
the November 13, 1990, meeting. While there is no information about what 
motivated the October target change, the FOMC’s policy directive from the 
November meeting makes it clear that the action was taken in response to 
weakening in economic activity, reflected in the growth rate of industrial 




The funds rate target was decreased from 8 percent to 3 percent from 
October 1990 to September 1992. The Committee maintained the target at 3 
percent until February 1994 when it began increasing the target. The target was 
raised by 300 basis points from February 1994 to February 1995. 
Estimates of Equation (10) for this period, reported in the bottom section 
of Table 3, show that estimates of  1 θ  and  2 θ  are highly statistically significant 
with the expected signs. Moreover, the estimate of 
2 R  indicates that these 
variables account for nearly half of the variation of changes in the funds rate. 
                                                 
38 Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee, October 2, 1990, p. 18. 
39 Federal Reserve Press Release, December 21, 1990, pp. 13-14.   44 
Consistent with the reaction function interpretation, these variables account for 
essentially none of the variation of changes in the 10-year Treasury yield. 
The second period begins on January 3, 2001, when the FOMC made a 
50-basis-point intermeeting cut in the funds rate target. The FOMC noted that 
“these actions were taken in light of further weakening of sales and production, 
and in the context of lower consumer confidence…”
40 The FOMC acted 
aggressively, cutting the target by 200 basis points by mid-May. The funds rate 
was further reduced over time to the then historical low of 1.0 percent on June 25, 
2003. In announcing the last cut, the FOMC stated its belief that “an 
accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with still robust underlying 
growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing support to economic 
activity.”
41
Estimates of Equation (10) over the period February 2001 through June 
2006, presented in the lower panel of Table 3, show that change in the federal rate 
is positively and significantly related to the growth of industrial production and 
negatively, though not significantly, related to the unemployment rate. 
Importantly, the equation accounts for more than 50 percent of the variation of 
changes in the funds rate, but almost none of the variation in the 10-year Treasury 
yield. 
 The target was maintained at 1.0 percent until late June 2004, when 
the FOMC made the first of 17 consecutive 25-basis-point increases in the target, 
the last coming on June 29, 2006. 
                                                 
40 Federal Reserve Press Release, January 3, 2001. 
41 Federal Reserve Press Release, June 25, 2003.   45 
These results support the conclusion obtained from the FOMC 
transcripts—namely, that the FOMC was targeting the funds rate and changing 
the target in response to changes in economic activity in furtherance of its 
economic stabilization objective. These results also provide strong support for the 
FTRH. 
8.0  Conclusions 
In February 2005, then-Chairman Alan Greenspan pointed out that 
Treasury yields changed little despite a 150-basis-point increase in the FOMC’s 
target for the federal funds. Dismissing several possible explanations, he called 
the uncharacteristic behavior a conundrum. This paper investigated the 
conundrum by examining the behavior of changes in the federal funds rate and 
changes in the 10-year Treasury yield since the early 1980s. This examination 
showed that the percent of variation in the 10-year yield that could be accounted 
for by the behavior of the funds rate declined dramatically from about 30 percent 
to zero around 1994 and remained at essentially zero thereafter. Further analysis 
established a single break in the relationship between these rates that occurred in 
the late 1980s—specifically, May 1988—well in advance of Greenspan’s 
observation. 
Finding alternative explanations for the marked change in the relationship 
between the funds rate and the Treasury yield lacking, I proposed an alternative 
hypothesis. Specifically, I hypothesize that the change in the relationship occurred 
because the FOMC began using the funds rate to implement policy in the late 
1980s, rather than simply using the funds rate to guide daily open market   46 
operations as it had done in the mid-to-late 1970s and early 1980s. Documentary 
and empirical evidence is presented that supports the claim that the FOMC began 
using the funds rate to implement monetary policy in the late 1980s. Several 
implications of the hypothesis are tested and evidence consist with the hypothesis 
is presented. 
The hypothesis offered here appears to be at odds with the conventional 
theory of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, which sees the Fed as 
affecting aggregate spending by affecting long-term rates through its control over 
the overnight policy rate, via the expectations hypothesis. This is not necessarily 
the case, however. The usefulness of the expectations hypothesis depends 
critically on the extent to which market participants can predict the future level of 
short-term rates. Evidence presented by Guidolin and Thornton (2010), Goodhart 
and Lim (2008), Rudebusch (2007), Andersson and Hofmann (2010), and others, 
however, indicates that short-term rates are very difficult to predict significantly 
beyond their current level. Hence, while the theoretical underpinnings of the 
expectations hypothesis may be correct, its practical application for monetary 
policy may be limited. Indeed, the recent focus of central banks (e.g., New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S.) on “forward guidance” is motivated by a 
desire to have a larger effect on longer-term rates by making the future path of the 
policy rate more predictable. 
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Table 1: Frequency Results for Granger Causality Test 
  ff   3 tb   6 tb   1 T   5 T  
January 1983 – May 1988 
hypothesis  The column rate does not Granger cause the row rate 
3 tb   0         
6 tb   0  0       
1 T   0  0  0     
5 T   0  0  0  0   
10 T   0  0  0  0  0 
hypothesis  The row rate does not Granger cause the column rate 
3 tb   25         
6 tb   25  0       
1 T   25  0  0     
5 T   25  0  0  0   
10 T   25  0  0  0  0 
June 1988 – March 2007 
hypothesis  The column rate does not Granger cause the row rate 
3 tb   9         
6 tb   0  8       
1 T   0  0  0     
5 T   0  4  7  9   
10 T   0  0  0  0  3 
hypothesis  The row rate does not Granger cause the column rate 
3 tb   25         
6 tb   25  25       
1 T   25  25  19     
5 T   25  8  15  24   
10 T   25  10  16  25  20 
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Table 2: Results of the regression 
Panel A: January 1983--May 1988 
  α  
* ff β
∆  
* no ff β
∆  
2
R   s.e.  Test 1  Test 2 
3 tb ∆  
-0.0011  0.7243  0.6268  0.3702  0.2989  0.1101   
(0.9760)  (0.0000)  (0.0205)      (0.7400)   
6 tb ∆  
-0.0058  0.7627  0.8699  0.5917  0.2407  0.2998   
(0.8518)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.5840)   
1 T ∆  
-0.0049  0.8221  0.8795  0.7452  0.1901  0.1706   
(0.8407)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.6796)   
5 T ∆  
-0.0002  0.9185  0.9906  0.9699  0.0654  2.5344   
(0.9819)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.1114)   
Panel B: June 1988--March 2007 
3 tb ∆  
-0.0203  0.3788  0.6772  0.1785  0.2025  3.8497  0.0490 
(0.1360)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.0498)  (0.8250) 
6 tb ∆  
-0.0206  0.4508  0.9618  0.3625  0.1784  16.6507  2.6399 
(0.0865)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.0000)  (0.1056) 
1 T ∆  
-0.0173  0.5210  0.9472  0.5353  0.1523  21.7755  2.2813 
(0.0906)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.0000)  (0.1324) 
5 T ∆  
-0.0048  0.7956  0.8914  0.9286  0.0597  8.9015  5.8566 
(0.2247)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)      (0.0028)  (0.0163) 
Test 1 is a Chi-square test the null hypothesis that 
* ff β
∆ =
* no ff β
∆  within the sample 
period. Test 2 is a Chi-square test the null hypothesis that the estimate of 
* no ff β
∆  
in the June 1988 – March 2007 is equal the estimate of the relationship for the 
January 1983 – May 1988 sample period. 
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Table 3: Estimates of the Policy Reaction Function 
Dependent 
Variable 
ff ∆   10 T ∆   ff ∆   10 T ∆  
  January 1983 – May 1988  June 1988 – March 2007 
























2 R   0.040  0.040  0.271  -0.004 
  December 1990 – February 1995  February 2001 –June 2006 
























2 R   0.446  -0.007  0.516  0.037 
 




















































Figure 1: 33-Month Rolling Regression of the Change in the 10-year 
Treasury on the Change in the Federal Funds Rate









1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure  2: Andrews' Break Point Test of 10-year Treasury on the 
Federal Funds Rate
Andrews' test statistic















































































































Figure 3: The Federal Funds and 10-Year Treasury Rates,  
January 1983 - March 2007







































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Latent-Factor Adjusted Federal Funds and 10-Year
Treasury Rates










Figure 5: The FOMC's Federal Funds Rate Objective and the 
Federal Funds Rate
(September 13, 1974 -September 19, 1979) 


































































































































































Figure 6: Average Difference Between the Federal funds Rate and the 
FOMC's Funds Rate Target















































































Figure 7: 33-Month Adj-Rsquares from Rolling Regressions of the 
Change in Various Rate on Changes in the Funds Rate












































































Figure 8: 33-Month Rolling Adj-Rsquares of Regressions of the 
Change in the 10-Year Yield on Changes in Various Rates













1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 9, Panel A: Andrews Break Point Test of 3-month TB on 
the Federal Funds Rate












1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 9, Panel B: Andrews Break Point Test of 6-month TB on 










1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 9, Panel C: Andrews Break Point Test of 1-year Treasury 












1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 9, Panel D: Andrews Break Point Test of 5-year Treasury 
on the Federal Funds Rate
Andrews' test statistic








1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 10, Panel A: Andrews Break Point Test of 10-year 













1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 10, Panel B: Andrews Break Point Test of 10-year 













1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 10, Panel C: Andrews Break Point Test of 10-year 









1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Figure 10, Panel D: Andrews Break Point Test of 10-year 
Treasury on the 5-year Treasury
Andrews' test statistic
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11, Panel C: Latent-Factor Adjusted Federal Funds and 1-Year 
Treasury Rates



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 12, Panel D: Latent-Factor Adjusted 10-Year and 5-Year
Treasury Rates























































































































































Figure 13: 24-Month Rolling Correlation of the Latent-Factor-Adjusted  Treasury and Federal 
Funds Rates























































































































































Figure 14: 24-Month Rolling Correlation of the Latent-Factor-Adjusted 
10-Year Yield and Other Rates
ff tb3 tb6 T1 T5Appendix A: Granger Causality Tests Results for All Possible Combinations 
of Lags from 2 through 6 (not intended for publication)
F-Statistics with P-values in Parentheses
TABLE A1
January 1983 to May 1988: ff and tb3
 tb3 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 7.494 7.040 7.157 6.956 6.775
P-value (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F 3 6.840 7.579 7.914 7.675 7.483
P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 5.458 5.697 5.826 5.674 5.571
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F 5 4.874 5.280 5.177 5.198 4.608
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
F 6 3.758 4.067 3.976 4.062 3.762
P-value (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
 ff does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.755 2.600 2.620 2.395 2.659
P-value (0.475) (0.083) (0.082) (0.101) (0.080)
F 3 0.866 2.716 2.476 2.361 2.415
P-value (0.464) (0.053) (0.071) (0.082) (0.078)
F 4 0.709 2.089 2.159 1.993 2.019
P-value (0.589) (0.095) (0.087) (0.110) (0.107)
F 5 0.584 1.650 1.857 1.734 1.818
P-value (0.712) (0.164) (0.119) (0.144) (0.128)
F 6 0.823 1.427 1.708 1.674 1.497
P-value (0.557) (0.224) (0.139) (0.148) (0.200)January 1983 to May 1988: ff and tb6
 tb6 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 8.321 7.727 7.685 7.788 7.619
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F 3 6.605 7.266 7.484 7.551 7.245
P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 5.271 5.452 5.508 5.559 5.340
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F 5 4.875 5.203 5.083 5.054 4.447
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
F 6 3.747 3.985 3.870 3.846 3.750
P-value (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
 ff does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.819 2.253 2.321 2.155 2.390
P-value (0.446) (0.115) (0.108) (0.126) (0.102)
F 3 0.812 2.040 1.913 1.881 1.930
P-value (0.492) (0.119) (0.139) (0.145) (0.137)
F 4 0.728 1.489 1.424 1.385 1.441
P-value (0.577) (0.219) (0.239) (0.253) (0.235)
F 5 0.733 1.368 1.346 1.179 1.325
P-value (0.602) (0.252) (0.260) (0.333) (0.270)
F 6 0.916 1.260 1.256 1.158 1.087
P-value (0.492) (0.293) (0.295) (0.345) (0.384)January 1983 to May 1988: ff and t1
 t1 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 10.134 9.414 9.168 9.175 9.112
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 3 7.146 7.542 7.563 7.613 7.462
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 5.879 5.888 5.766 5.742 5.600
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F 5 5.032 5.094 5.026 4.981 4.549
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
F 6 3.944 3.979 3.924 3.868 3.944
P-value (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
 ff does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.350 1.178 1.260 1.235 1.398
P-value (0.706) (0.315) (0.292) (0.299) (0.257)
F 3 0.466 1.065 0.909 0.911 0.982
P-value (0.707) (0.371) (0.443) (0.442) (0.409)
F 4 0.425 0.787 0.743 0.820 0.985
P-value (0.790) (0.538) (0.567) (0.519) (0.424)
F 5 0.570 0.919 0.767 0.719 0.902
P-value (0.722) (0.477) (0.578) (0.612) (0.488)
F 6 0.701 0.868 0.820 0.810 0.736
P-value (0.650) (0.525) (0.560) (0.568) (0.623)January 1983 to May 1988: ff and t5
 t5 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 7.254 6.776 6.629 6.771 7.643
P-value (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
F 3 4.676 4.816 4.821 4.975 5.486
P-value (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
F 4 3.967 3.929 3.849 3.914 4.348
P-value (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
F 5 3.447 3.414 3.346 3.282 3.452
P-value (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
F 6 2.736 2.701 2.648 2.600 3.108
P-value (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.012)
 ff does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.113 0.551 0.415 0.420 0.494
P-value (0.893) (0.579) (0.662) (0.659) (0.613)
F 3 0.495 0.363 0.366 0.364 0.456
P-value (0.687) (0.780) (0.778) (0.780) (0.714)
F 4 0.404 0.249 0.473 0.558 0.828
P-value (0.805) (0.909) (0.756) (0.694) (0.514)
F 5 0.560 0.446 0.490 0.486 0.706
P-value (0.730) (0.814) (0.782) (0.785) (0.622)
F 6 0.649 0.500 0.639 0.624 0.590
P-value (0.691) (0.805) (0.699) (0.710) (0.737)January 1983 to May 1988: ff and t10
 t10 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 7.280 6.829 6.668 6.745 7.578
P-value (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
F 3 4.630 4.724 4.674 4.764 5.234
P-value (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
F 4 3.955 3.895 3.813 3.847 4.287
P-value (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
F 5 3.423 3.367 3.311 3.251 3.435
P-value (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
F 6 2.753 2.702 2.658 2.625 3.074
P-value (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.013)
 ff does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.056 0.351 0.249 0.247 0.260
P-value (0.946) (0.706) (0.781) (0.782) (0.772)
F 3 0.402 0.277 0.386 0.389 0.461
P-value (0.752) (0.842) (0.763) (0.762) (0.711)
F 4 0.340 0.205 0.462 0.608 0.797
P-value (0.850) (0.934) (0.763) (0.659) (0.533)
F 5 0.549 0.443 0.536 0.546 0.711
P-value (0.738) (0.816) (0.748) (0.741) (0.618)
F 6 0.560 0.444 0.599 0.593 0.580
P-value (0.760) (0.846) (0.730) (0.734) (0.744)January 1983 to May 1988: tb6 and tb3
 tb6 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.566 1.181 1.108 1.211 1.259
P-value (0.218) (0.315) (0.338) (0.306) (0.293)
F 3 2.526 1.032 1.014 1.196 0.975
P-value (0.067) (0.386) (0.394) (0.321) (0.412)
F 4 1.735 0.795 0.756 0.879 0.741
P-value (0.156) (0.534) (0.559) (0.483) (0.569)
F 5 1.733 1.066 1.037 1.350 1.122
P-value (0.144) (0.390) (0.406) (0.259) (0.362)
F 6 1.519 0.771 0.798 1.067 1.079
P-value (0.191) (0.597) (0.576) (0.395) (0.389)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.041 2.075 2.075 2.080 1.800
P-value (0.139) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.176)
F 3 3.600 2.405 2.486 2.634 2.005
P-value (0.019) (0.077) (0.071) (0.060) (0.126)
F 4 2.816 1.976 1.978 2.051 1.514
P-value (0.034) (0.112) (0.112) (0.101) (0.213)
F 5 2.225 1.614 1.641 2.005 1.557
P-value (0.066) (0.173) (0.166) (0.094) (0.191)
F 6 1.868 1.183 1.177 1.436 1.761
P-value (0.105) (0.331) (0.334) (0.221) (0.129)January 1983 to May 1988: t1 and tb3
 t1 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.489 1.164 1.034 1.057 1.473
P-value (0.234) (0.320) (0.363) (0.355) (0.239)
F 3 1.970 1.131 1.055 1.186 1.161
P-value (0.129) (0.345) (0.376) (0.324) (0.334)
F 4 1.352 0.899 0.971 0.974 1.201
P-value (0.263) (0.471) (0.431) (0.430) (0.323)
F 5 1.340 1.205 1.272 1.636 1.611
P-value (0.262) (0.320) (0.291) (0.168) (0.176)
F 6 1.289 0.954 1.156 1.469 1.521
P-value (0.280) (0.466) (0.345) (0.209) (0.193)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.604 0.664 0.575 0.560 0.437
P-value (0.550) (0.519) (0.566) (0.575) (0.649)
F 3 2.401 1.022 1.030 1.078 0.671
P-value (0.077) (0.390) (0.387) (0.367) (0.574)
F 4 2.127 1.119 0.790 0.818 0.498
P-value (0.090) (0.357) (0.537) (0.520) (0.737)
F 5 1.637 0.868 0.606 0.981 0.744
P-value (0.167) (0.509) (0.695) (0.439) (0.595)
F 6 1.533 0.869 0.795 0.964 1.318
P-value (0.187) (0.525) (0.578) (0.460) (0.268)January 1983 to May 1988: t5 and tb3
 t5 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.390 1.379 1.338 1.497 2.272
P-value (0.101) (0.260) (0.271) (0.233) (0.114)
F 3 2.219 0.925 0.901 1.023 1.484
P-value (0.096) (0.435) (0.447) (0.390) (0.230)
F 4 1.797 1.082 1.112 1.094 1.884
P-value (0.143) (0.375) (0.361) (0.370) (0.128)
F 5 1.692 1.218 1.286 1.190 1.656
P-value (0.153) (0.314) (0.285) (0.328) (0.164)
F 6 1.619 1.094 1.416 1.334 1.478
P-value (0.162) (0.379) (0.228) (0.261) (0.207)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.161 0.211 0.138 0.126 0.071
P-value (0.852) (0.810) (0.872) (0.882) (0.932)
F 3 1.092 0.220 0.238 0.217 0.113
P-value (0.360) (0.882) (0.870) (0.884) (0.952)
F 4 0.898 0.278 0.235 0.232 0.330
P-value (0.472) (0.891) (0.918) (0.919) (0.856)
F 5 0.707 0.216 0.180 0.276 0.356
P-value (0.621) (0.954) (0.969) (0.924) (0.876)
F 6 0.637 0.343 0.461 0.488 0.471
P-value (0.700) (0.910) (0.834) (0.814) (0.826)January 1983 to May 1988: t10 and tb3
 t10 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags fo tb3
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.279 1.282 1.280 1.442 2.198
P-value (0.112) (0.285) (0.286) (0.246) (0.122)
F 3 1.928 0.892 0.915 1.034 1.456
P-value (0.136) (0.451) (0.440) (0.385) (0.238)
F 4 1.563 1.085 1.078 1.105 1.775
P-value (0.197) (0.373) (0.377) (0.365) (0.149)
F 5 1.603 1.334 1.372 1.261 1.654
P-value (0.176) (0.265) (0.251) (0.296) (0.165)
F 6 1.472 1.165 1.435 1.341 1.420
P-value (0.207) (0.340) (0.221) (0.258) (0.228)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.117 0.068 0.069 0.074 0.039
P-value (0.890) (0.935) (0.934) (0.929) (0.961)
F 3 0.529 0.074 0.118 0.114 0.064
P-value (0.664) (0.974) (0.949) (0.951) (0.979)
F 4 0.415 0.082 0.200 0.239 0.363
P-value (0.797) (0.988) (0.937) (0.915) (0.833)
F 5 0.324 0.063 0.153 0.243 0.332
P-value (0.896) (0.997) (0.978) (0.941) (0.891)
F 6 0.292 0.140 0.300 0.353 0.351
P-value (0.938) (0.990) (0.934) (0.905) (0.905)January 1983 to May 1988: t1 and tb6
 t1 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.111 1.193 1.122 0.939 1.451
P-value (0.336) (0.311) (0.333) (0.398) (0.244)
F 3 2.045 0.785 0.734 0.620 0.954
P-value (0.118) (0.508) (0.536) (0.605) (0.422)
F 4 1.621 0.746 1.439 1.250 1.972
P-value (0.182) (0.565) (0.234) (0.302) (0.114)
F 5 1.298 0.634 1.188 1.114 1.682
P-value (0.279) (0.675) (0.328) (0.365) (0.157)
F 6 1.289 0.635 1.380 1.409 1.452
P-value (0.280) (0.702) (0.242) (0.231) (0.216)
 tb6 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.173 0.211 0.168 0.135 0.334
P-value (0.842) (0.810) (0.846) (0.874) (0.717)
F 3 1.659 0.353 0.329 0.309 0.347
P-value (0.186) (0.787) (0.804) (0.819) (0.792)
F 4 1.344 0.403 0.545 0.528 0.755
P-value (0.266) (0.805) (0.704) (0.716) (0.560)
F 5 1.073 0.356 0.431 0.482 0.706
P-value (0.386) (0.876) (0.825) (0.788) (0.622)
F 6 1.036 0.369 0.674 0.722 0.781
P-value (0.413) (0.895) (0.671) (0.634) (0.589)January 1983 to May 1988: t5 and tb6
 t5 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.779 1.174 1.217 1.396 1.881
P-value (0.178) (0.317) (0.304) (0.257) (0.163)
F 3 2.023 0.796 0.828 0.943 1.303
P-value (0.121) (0.502) (0.484) (0.427) (0.284)
F 4 1.923 1.101 1.316 1.330 2.300
P-value (0.120) (0.366) (0.276) (0.272) (0.072)
F 5 1.630 0.987 1.195 1.052 1.802
P-value (0.169) (0.435) (0.325) (0.398) (0.131)
F 6 1.615 0.995 1.553 1.462 1.484
P-value (0.163) (0.439) (0.182) (0.212) (0.205)
 tb6 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.060 0.013 0.038 0.038 0.077
P-value (0.942) (0.987) (0.963) (0.962) (0.926)
F 3 1.121 0.059 0.122 0.110 0.115
P-value (0.349) (0.981) (0.947) (0.954) (0.951)
F 4 0.897 0.126 0.527 0.531 0.885
P-value (0.472) (0.972) (0.716) (0.713) (0.480)
F 5 0.760 0.158 0.435 0.417 0.694
P-value (0.582) (0.977) (0.822) (0.835) (0.631)
F 6 0.624 0.142 0.630 0.616 0.576
P-value (0.710) (0.990) (0.706) (0.716) (0.747)January 1983 to May 1988: t10 and tb6
 t10 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.721 1.070 1.102 1.295 1.782
P-value (0.188) (0.350) (0.340) (0.283) (0.179)
F 3 1.801 0.708 0.725 0.855 1.179
P-value (0.158) (0.551) (0.542) (0.470) (0.327)
F 4 1.730 1.074 1.257 1.387 2.242
P-value (0.157) (0.379) (0.299) (0.252) (0.078)
F 5 1.527 1.002 1.218 1.102 1.756
P-value (0.197) (0.426) (0.315) (0.371) (0.140)
F 6 1.471 1.002 1.514 1.457 1.436
P-value (0.207) (0.435) (0.194) (0.214) (0.221)
 tb6 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.188 0.059 0.077 0.093 0.090
P-value (0.830) (0.943) (0.926) (0.912) (0.914)
F 3 0.710 0.083 0.153 0.147 0.147
P-value (0.550) (0.969) (0.927) (0.931) (0.931)
F 4 0.527 0.074 0.597 0.670 0.906
P-value (0.716) (0.990) (0.666) (0.616) (0.468)
F 5 0.489 0.143 0.570 0.528 0.713
P-value (0.783) (0.981) (0.723) (0.754) (0.617)
F 6 0.379 0.105 0.621 0.596 0.582
P-value (0.889) (0.995) (0.713) (0.732) (0.743)January 1983 to May 1988: t5 and t1
 t5 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.941 0.466 0.736 0.883 1.145
P-value (0.396) (0.630) (0.484) (0.420) (0.326)
F 3 1.546 0.317 0.490 0.594 0.771
P-value (0.213) (0.813) (0.691) (0.622) (0.516)
F 4 1.721 0.870 0.549 0.630 1.111
P-value (0.159) (0.488) (0.701) (0.643) (0.362)
F 5 1.471 0.791 0.543 0.501 0.872
P-value (0.215) (0.561) (0.743) (0.774) (0.507)
F 6 1.440 0.800 0.758 0.736 0.721
P-value (0.218) (0.575) (0.606) (0.623) (0.635)
 t1 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.089 0.005 0.054 0.066 0.097
P-value (0.915) (0.995) (0.947) (0.936) (0.908)
F 3 1.230 0.051 0.135 0.126 0.143
P-value (0.307) (0.985) (0.939) (0.945) (0.933)
F 4 1.164 0.275 0.418 0.430 0.760
P-value (0.337) (0.893) (0.795) (0.786) (0.557)
F 5 0.946 0.259 0.367 0.340 0.596
P-value (0.459) (0.933) (0.869) (0.886) (0.703)
F 6 0.773 0.198 0.528 0.515 0.487
P-value (0.595) (0.976) (0.784) (0.794) (0.815)January 1983 to May 1988: t10 and t1
 t10 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.959 0.445 0.663 0.800 1.091
P-value (0.389) (0.643) (0.520) (0.455) (0.344)
F 3 1.410 0.293 0.438 0.523 0.718
P-value (0.249) (0.831) (0.727) (0.668) (0.546)
F 4 1.559 0.880 0.554 0.672 1.105
P-value (0.198) (0.482) (0.697) (0.615) (0.365)
F 5 1.375 0.807 0.564 0.532 0.866
P-value (0.249) (0.550) (0.727) (0.751) (0.511)
F 6 1.310 0.831 0.758 0.746 0.709
P-value (0.270) (0.551) (0.606) (0.615) (0.644)
 t1 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.240 0.073 0.091 0.105 0.094
P-value (0.788) (0.930) (0.913) (0.900) (0.910)
F 3 0.851 0.124 0.228 0.204 0.227
P-value (0.472) (0.946) (0.877) (0.893) (0.877)
F 4 0.726 0.187 0.538 0.609 0.825
P-value (0.578) (0.944) (0.709) (0.658) (0.515)
F 5 0.645 0.229 0.574 0.498 0.676
P-value (0.667) (0.948) (0.719) (0.776) (0.644)
F 6 0.491 0.154 0.608 0.570 0.576
P-value (0.812) (0.987) (0.723) (0.752) (0.748)January 1983 to May 1988: t10 and t5
 t10 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.274 0.091 0.017 0.018 0.036
P-value (0.762) (0.913) (0.983) (0.983) (0.964)
F 3 1.241 0.064 0.082 0.059 0.160
P-value (0.304) (0.979) (0.970) (0.981) (0.922)
F 4 1.496 0.739 0.234 0.261 0.306
P-value (0.216) (0.569) (0.918) (0.901) (0.873)
F 5 1.226 0.602 0.239 0.219 0.242
P-value (0.310) (0.698) (0.943) (0.953) (0.942)
F 6 1.034 0.589 0.229 0.223 0.224
P-value (0.415) (0.737) (0.965) (0.967) (0.967)
 t5 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.230 0.115 0.036 0.034 0.033
P-value (0.795) (0.891) (0.965) (0.966) (0.967)
F 3 0.887 0.158 0.289 0.210 0.319
P-value (0.453) (0.924) (0.833) (0.889) (0.812)
F 4 1.021 0.535 0.299 0.298 0.354
P-value (0.405) (0.710) (0.877) (0.878) (0.840)
F 5 0.843 0.443 0.300 0.235 0.278
P-value (0.526) (0.816) (0.910) (0.945) (0.923)
F 6 0.702 0.416 0.264 0.234 0.231
P-value (0.650) (0.865) (0.951) (0.963) (0.964)TABLE A2
June 1988 to March 2007: tb3 and ff
 tb3 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 36.661 36.185 36.998 36.767 37.021
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 3 29.739 24.687 25.414 25.150 25.234
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 29.478 22.781 21.169 20.887 21.079
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 5 23.686 18.296 16.826 16.731 16.934
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 6 19.611 15.145 13.883 13.839 14.065
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 ff does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 4.654 2.325 0.986 1.114 0.690
P-value (0.010) (0.100) (0.375) (0.330) (0.503)
F 3 5.316 3.695 0.740 0.882 0.651
P-value (0.001) (0.013) (0.529) (0.451) (0.583)
F 4 4.635 3.383 0.553 0.683 0.516
P-value (0.001) (0.010) (0.697) (0.605) (0.724)
F 5 3.784 2.809 0.526 0.552 0.430
P-value (0.003) (0.018) (0.756) (0.736) (0.827)
F 6 3.223 2.536 0.733 0.752 0.734
P-value (0.005) (0.022) (0.624) (0.608) (0.623)June 1988 to March 2007: ff and tb6
 tb6 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 44.627 40.533 42.411 42.167 42.386
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 3 32.143 27.053 28.604 28.337 28.498
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 29.602 23.223 22.666 22.438 22.974
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 5 23.846 18.600 17.991 17.893 18.293
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 6 20.553 16.015 15.114 15.000 15.221
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 ff does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.951 1.960 0.445 0.563 0.433
P-value (0.054) (0.143) (0.641) (0.570) (0.649)
F 3 2.432 1.810 0.297 0.406 0.288
P-value (0.066) (0.146) (0.828) (0.749) (0.834)
F 4 2.331 1.786 0.286 0.517 0.324
P-value (0.057) (0.133) (0.887) (0.723) (0.862)
F 5 1.877 1.496 0.253 0.412 0.290
P-value (0.100) (0.192) (0.938) (0.840) (0.918)
F 6 1.856 1.529 0.781 0.866 0.597
P-value (0.090) (0.170) (0.586) (0.521) (0.733)June 1988 to March 2007: ff and t1
 t1 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 38.749 36.231 39.010 38.649 39.351
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 3 26.164 24.223 25.886 25.645 26.110
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 24.306 20.437 20.551 20.438 21.415
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 5 19.513 16.285 16.520 16.556 17.156
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 6 17.151 13.798 13.693 13.685 14.234
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 ff does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.502 1.002 0.226 0.246 0.135
P-value (0.606) (0.369) (0.798) (0.782) (0.874)
F 3 0.655 1.404 0.297 0.512 0.255
P-value (0.581) (0.242) (0.827) (0.674) (0.858)
F 4 1.034 1.383 0.258 0.541 0.286
P-value (0.391) (0.241) (0.904) (0.706) (0.887)
F 5 0.879 1.270 0.243 0.434 0.251
P-value (0.496) (0.278) (0.943) (0.825) (0.939)
F 6 1.176 1.470 1.034 1.012 0.828
P-value (0.320) (0.190) (0.404) (0.418) (0.549)June 1988 to March 2007: ff and t5
 t5 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 13.557 18.664 21.825 21.609 22.283
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 3 9.139 12.480 15.311 15.245 15.798
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 7.950 9.708 11.782 11.908 12.561
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 5 6.406 7.716 9.489 9.660 10.038
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 6 5.525 6.367 7.856 8.041 8.424
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 ff does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.650 1.672 2.982 2.438 1.928
P-value (0.073) (0.190) (0.053) (0.090) (0.148)
F 3 2.100 1.490 2.159 1.844 1.571
P-value (0.101) (0.218) (0.094) (0.140) (0.197)
F 4 1.623 1.257 1.728 1.464 1.240
P-value (0.170) (0.288) (0.145) (0.214) (0.295)
F 5 1.436 1.217 1.411 1.204 1.019
P-value (0.213) (0.302) (0.221) (0.309) (0.407)
F 6 1.318 1.126 1.384 1.170 1.047
P-value (0.251) (0.348) (0.223) (0.324) (0.396)June 1988 to March 2007: ff and t10
 t5 does not Granger Cause ff
Lags of ff
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 8.913 13.197 14.752 14.556 14.754
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 3 6.352 9.403 11.554 11.466 11.782
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 4 4.987 7.045 8.707 8.708 9.002
P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 5 4.097 5.586 6.955 6.995 7.171
P-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 6 3.413 4.636 5.913 5.989 6.174
P-value (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 ff does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t10
Lags of ff 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.742 1.118 2.013 2.173 1.748
P-value (0.178) (0.329) (0.136) (0.116) (0.177)
F 3 1.521 1.073 1.537 1.595 1.355
P-value (0.210) (0.361) (0.206) (0.192) (0.258)
F 4 1.518 1.466 1.745 1.834 1.584
P-value (0.198) (0.214) (0.141) (0.123) (0.180)
F 5 1.240 1.228 1.384 1.461 1.263
P-value (0.291) (0.297) (0.232) (0.204) (0.281)
F 6 1.062 1.042 1.182 1.283 1.104
P-value (0.386) (0.399) (0.317) (0.266) (0.361)June 1988 to March 2007: tb6 and tb3
 tb6 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 16.075 12.782 7.615 7.726 7.696
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F 3 10.348 8.531 5.128 5.160 5.296
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F 4 9.841 8.582 3.843 3.863 3.966
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
F 5 8.085 7.004 3.319 3.507 3.547
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
F 6 6.489 5.858 2.953 3.037 2.967
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 5.185 3.779 1.146 1.600 1.301
P-value (0.006) (0.024) (0.320) (0.204) (0.274)
F 3 3.226 2.512 0.771 1.071 0.939
P-value (0.023) (0.060) (0.511) (0.362) (0.422)
F 4 3.829 3.249 0.852 1.195 0.947
P-value (0.005) (0.013) (0.494) (0.314) (0.438)
F 5 3.083 2.665 0.771 1.152 0.891
P-value (0.010) (0.023) (0.572) (0.334) (0.488)
F 6 2.378 2.027 0.727 1.001 0.740
P-value (0.030) (0.063) (0.628) (0.426) (0.618)June 1988 to March 2007: t1 and tb3
 t1 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 10.848 8.017 5.819 5.697 5.893
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
F 3 6.962 5.391 3.909 3.833 3.912
P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
F 4 8.682 7.358 3.156 3.099 3.189
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
F 5 7.187 6.285 2.981 3.514 3.440
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005)
F 6 5.947 5.114 2.490 2.840 2.865
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.988 1.193 0.047 0.217 0.123
P-value (0.374) (0.305) (0.954) (0.805) (0.884)
F 3 0.542 1.193 0.363 0.841 0.397
P-value (0.654) (0.313) (0.780) (0.473) (0.755)
F 4 1.480 2.004 0.271 0.631 0.298
P-value (0.209) (0.095) (0.896) (0.641) (0.879)
F 5 1.145 1.573 0.220 0.967 0.629
P-value (0.337) (0.169) (0.953) (0.439) (0.678)
F 6 0.854 1.062 0.183 0.710 0.531
P-value (0.530) (0.386) (0.981) (0.642) (0.785)June 1988 to March 2007: t5 and tb3
 t5 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.022 1.487 3.301 3.265 3.667
P-value (0.362) (0.228) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027)
F 3 1.005 1.009 2.325 2.322 2.816
P-value (0.391) (0.390) (0.076) (0.076) (0.040)
F 4 3.186 3.044 1.903 1.952 2.341
P-value (0.014) (0.018) (0.111) (0.103) (0.056)
F 5 2.590 2.573 1.685 1.976 2.122
P-value (0.027) (0.028) (0.139) (0.084) (0.064)
F 6 2.135 2.059 1.607 1.805 2.138
P-value (0.051) (0.059) (0.147) (0.099) (0.050)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.956 2.146 3.502 2.919 2.571
P-value (0.054) (0.119) (0.032) (0.056) (0.079)
F 3 2.274 2.134 3.006 2.681 2.552
P-value (0.081) (0.097) (0.031) (0.048) (0.057)
F 4 1.693 1.588 2.562 2.312 2.166
P-value (0.153) (0.179) (0.040) (0.059) (0.074)
F 5 1.338 1.267 2.061 1.953 1.822
P-value (0.249) (0.279) (0.072) (0.087) (0.110)
F 6 1.118 1.046 1.711 1.596 1.543
P-value (0.353) (0.397) (0.120) (0.150) (0.166)June 1988 to March 2007: t10 and tb3
 t10 does not Granger Cause tb3
Lags of tb3
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.023 1.891 3.435 3.366 3.700
P-value (0.361) (0.153) (0.034) (0.036) (0.026)
F 3 0.858 1.270 2.496 2.462 2.923
P-value (0.464) (0.285) (0.061) (0.064) (0.035)
F 4 2.530 2.597 2.105 2.136 2.494
P-value (0.042) (0.037) (0.081) (0.077) (0.044)
F 5 2.028 2.098 1.735 1.847 2.047
P-value (0.076) (0.067) (0.128) (0.105) (0.073)
F 6 1.851 2.080 2.233 2.337 2.824
P-value (0.091) (0.057) (0.041) (0.033) (0.012)
 tb3 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of tb3 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.068 1.536 2.380 2.573 2.270
P-value (0.129) (0.218) (0.095) (0.079) (0.106)
F 3 1.739 1.716 2.163 2.225 2.152
P-value (0.160) (0.165) (0.093) (0.086) (0.095)
F 4 1.245 1.346 2.194 2.264 2.158
P-value (0.293) (0.254) (0.071) (0.063) (0.075)
F 5 0.992 1.097 1.754 1.803 1.719
P-value (0.424) (0.363) (0.124) (0.114) (0.132)
F 6 0.848 0.952 1.479 1.523 1.446
P-value (0.534) (0.459) (0.187) (0.172) (0.199)June 1988 to March 2007: t1 and tb6
 t1 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.956 2.139 3.127 3.048 3.239
P-value (0.054) (0.120) (0.046) (0.050) (0.041)
F 3 1.888 2.602 3.166 3.212 2.824
P-value (0.133) (0.053) (0.025) (0.024) (0.040)
F 4 4.618 4.770 2.444 2.480 2.368
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.045) (0.054)
F 5 3.739 4.088 2.277 2.712 2.512
P-value (0.003) (0.001) (0.048) (0.021) (0.031)
F 6 3.339 3.317 1.991 2.237 2.180
P-value (0.004) (0.004) (0.068) (0.041) (0.046)
 tb6 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 0.336 0.368 0.116 0.046 0.094
P-value (0.715) (0.693) (0.891) (0.955) (0.910)
F 3 0.158 0.990 0.552 0.832 0.537
P-value (0.925) (0.398) (0.647) (0.478) (0.658)
F 4 1.655 2.274 0.475 0.657 0.537
P-value (0.162) (0.062) (0.754) (0.623) (0.709)
F 5 1.299 1.856 0.446 1.116 0.894
P-value (0.265) (0.103) (0.816) (0.353) (0.486)
F 6 1.002 1.304 0.555 1.016 0.887
P-value (0.425) (0.257) (0.766) (0.416) (0.505)June 1988 to March 2007: t5 and tb6
 t5 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.005 2.022 4.246 4.178 4.654
P-value (0.368) (0.135) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011)
F 3 0.757 2.040 3.007 2.941 3.113
P-value (0.520) (0.109) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027)
F 4 2.981 3.605 2.372 2.343 2.605
P-value (0.020) (0.007) (0.053) (0.056) (0.037)
F 5 2.422 2.964 2.039 2.256 2.284
P-value (0.037) (0.013) (0.074) (0.050) (0.048)
F 6 1.982 2.354 1.757 1.909 2.417
P-value (0.070) (0.032) (0.109) (0.081) (0.028)
 tb6 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 3.529 2.660 3.986 3.399 3.035
P-value (0.031) (0.072) (0.020) (0.035) (0.050)
F 3 2.521 2.372 3.075 2.733 2.622
P-value (0.059) (0.071) (0.029) (0.045) (0.052)
F 4 1.975 1.806 2.751 2.458 2.388
P-value (0.099) (0.129) (0.029) (0.047) (0.052)
F 5 1.564 1.465 2.184 2.025 1.971
P-value (0.171) (0.203) (0.057) (0.076) (0.084)
F 6 1.294 1.216 1.917 1.750 1.835
P-value (0.261) (0.299) (0.079) (0.111) (0.094)June 1988 to March 2007: t10 and tb6
 t10 does not Granger Cause tb6
Lags of tb6
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 1.661 2.830 4.773 4.696 5.066
P-value (0.192) (0.061) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
F 3 1.176 2.423 3.253 3.193 3.362
P-value (0.320) (0.067) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020)
F 4 2.772 3.291 2.576 2.554 2.798
P-value (0.028) (0.012) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027)
F 5 2.249 2.646 2.123 2.170 2.265
P-value (0.051) (0.024) (0.064) (0.059) (0.049)
F 6 1.902 2.317 2.103 2.171 2.960
P-value (0.082) (0.035) (0.054) (0.047) (0.009)
 tb6 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of tb6 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.106 1.563 2.257 2.383 2.097
P-value (0.124) (0.212) (0.107) (0.095) (0.125)
F 3 1.501 1.386 1.671 1.729 1.628
P-value (0.215) (0.248) (0.174) (0.162) (0.184)
F 4 1.048 1.041 1.989 2.100 2.037
P-value (0.383) (0.387) (0.097) (0.082) (0.090)
F 5 0.829 0.849 1.593 1.674 1.622
P-value (0.530) (0.516) (0.163) (0.142) (0.156)
F 6 0.706 0.747 1.400 1.491 1.480
P-value (0.645) (0.612) (0.216) (0.182) (0.186)June 1988 to March 2007: t5 and t1
 t5 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 3.384 3.394 5.573 5.051 5.429
P-value (0.036) (0.035) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
F 3 2.484 2.800 3.791 3.463 3.618
P-value (0.062) (0.041) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014)
F 4 4.550 4.506 2.878 2.621 2.789
P-value (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.036) (0.027)
F 5 3.702 3.646 2.461 2.287 2.321
P-value (0.003) (0.003) (0.034) (0.047) (0.044)
F 6 2.954 2.919 2.097 1.950 2.543
P-value (0.009) (0.009) (0.055) (0.074) (0.021)
 t1 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 4.110 3.184 4.268 3.761 3.389
P-value (0.018) (0.043) (0.015) (0.025) (0.036)
F 3 2.870 2.264 2.846 2.519 2.320
P-value (0.037) (0.082) (0.039) (0.059) (0.076)
F 4 2.527 1.966 2.411 2.107 1.988
P-value (0.042) (0.101) (0.050) (0.081) (0.098)
F 5 2.071 1.674 1.929 1.678 1.588
P-value (0.070) (0.142) (0.091) (0.141) (0.165)
F 6 1.621 1.330 1.648 1.430 1.563
P-value (0.143) (0.245) (0.136) (0.204) (0.159)June 1988 to March 2007: t10 and t1
 t10 does not Granger Cause t1
Lags of t1
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 4.204 4.239 6.256 5.795 6.156
P-value (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
F 3 3.228 3.509 4.316 4.039 4.140
P-value (0.023) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
F 4 4.644 4.576 3.363 3.130 3.283
P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012)
F 5 3.763 3.681 2.798 2.553 2.628
P-value (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.029) (0.025)
F 6 3.176 3.140 2.580 2.391 3.169
P-value (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.030) (0.005)
 t1 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of t1 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.260 1.838 2.340 2.379 2.110
P-value (0.107) (0.162) (0.099) (0.095) (0.124)
F 3 1.636 1.291 1.555 1.582 1.403
P-value (0.182) (0.278) (0.201) (0.195) (0.243)
F 4 1.275 0.998 1.657 1.786 1.686
P-value (0.281) (0.410) (0.161) (0.133) (0.154)
F 5 1.024 0.843 1.313 1.500 1.374
P-value (0.404) (0.521) (0.260) (0.191) (0.235)
F 6 0.801 0.689 1.131 1.311 1.303
P-value (0.570) (0.659) (0.345) (0.254) (0.257)June 1988 to March 2007: t10 and t5 
 t10 does not Granger Cause t5
Lags of t5
Lags of t10 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 3.931 3.375 3.773 3.467 3.299
P-value (0.021) (0.036) (0.025) (0.033) (0.039)
F 3 3.705 2.944 2.858 2.697 2.587
P-value (0.012) (0.034) (0.038) (0.047) (0.054)
F 4 3.992 3.203 2.611 2.376 2.294
P-value (0.004) (0.014) (0.036) (0.053) (0.061)
F 5 3.171 2.551 2.070 2.698 2.528
P-value (0.009) (0.029) (0.070) (0.022) (0.030)
F 6 2.815 2.360 2.062 2.384 2.331
P-value (0.012) (0.032) (0.059) (0.030) (0.034)
 t5 does not Granger Cause t10
Lags of t10
Lags of t5 2 3 4 5 6
F 2 2.726 2.758 3.055 3.047 2.742
P-value (0.068) (0.066) (0.049) (0.050) (0.067)
F 3 2.471 2.097 2.060 2.053 1.868
P-value (0.063) (0.102) (0.107) (0.108) (0.136)
F 4 2.639 2.151 1.751 1.795 1.678
P-value (0.035) (0.076) (0.140) (0.131) (0.156)
F 5 2.115 1.745 1.392 2.288 2.038
P-value (0.065) (0.126) (0.229) (0.047) (0.075)
F 6 1.701 1.441 1.209 1.920 1.905
P-value (0.122) (0.200) (0.303) (0.079) (0.081)